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PUBLIC WORKS AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES:  
TOWARDS A LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
 
Radhika Lal,* Steve Miller, ** Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song*** and Daniel Kostzer**** 
ABSTRACT 
Public works and employment programmes have long been considered a staple of social 
assistance. For the most part, though, they have been designed as short-term ‘safety nets’. While, in 
some cases, the focus has also been on reducing poverty or addressing structural unemployment 
challenges, their implementation has seldom been on a scale that would make a dent in structural 
poverty. The fact that large scale programmes such as India’s National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which was initiated prior to the recent economic crisis, could also be 
effective in responding speedily to and mitigating the effects of the crisis has elicited interest in 
such policies as a component of inclusive growth paths. In making the case for a longer-term 
development approach, the paper points out that such an approach would not only allow these 
programmes to act as shock absorbers without being ‘too little, too late‘ but would also enable the 
state to strengthen its capacities to provide support to livelihood strategies of the poor through 
addressing critical public goods and service deficits while creating jobs. In this context, the paper 
assesses the desirability and feasibility of adopting a universal or a partial Employment Guarantee 
(EG) to make such programmes a more stable complement to market-driven employment creation 
in situations where levels of poverty, in particular, working poverty, and underemployment are 
high. The paper also explores the complementarities and interactions with various social assistance 
and cash transfer programmes with a view to fostering a more comprehensive approach to social 
protection for the poor. The paper concludes with a section on implementation issues with a view 
to strengthening learning on how to plan, design and implement long-term and Employment 
Guarantee types of public employment programmes. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Public works have long been considered a staple of social assistance programmes. However, 
for the most part, they have been designed as short-term ‘safety nets’.1  While, in some  
cases, the focus has been on poverty reduction or on addressing structural unemployment 
challenges (e.g., those arising from shifts in labour intensity in growth sectors and/or decline in 
sectors that were relatively better at absorbing labour), they have seldom been implemented 
on a scale that would allow them to make a dent in structural poverty. 
The paper begins, in Section 2, with an exploration of the employment challenge and the 
role that public employment programmes can play not only in mitigating crises, but also in 
contributing to facilitating recovery. Section 3 then quickly proceeds to look at PEPs in the 
context of a medium- and long-term framework.  It suggests that, to function effectively, 
public employment programmes need to be re-conceived not as a safety net—which even  
in crisis situations often gives rise to the phenomena of ‘too little, too late’—but as a flexible 
mechanism to respond to labour market, development challenges and shocks.  In this context, 
the paper assesses the desirability and feasibility of an employment guarantee framework that 
would make public employment programmes (PEPs) a more permanent complement to 
market-driven employment creation, i.e., the employment guarantee would serve to create a 
‘buffer’ mechanism, providing employment for individuals when there is high unemployment 
and for them to leave when the labour market improves.2 
Section 4 explores linkages with other development policies, in particular with active 
labour market, training and social protection and social assistance policies.  In comparing PEPs 
with other forms of social assistance, it finds that the programmes can be complementary.  
At various points in their lives, individuals and families may be more or less constrained in 
being able to work, so there needs to be an integrated approach that incorporates protective, 
preventive, promotive, and transformative dimensions (Devereux, and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004) 
of social protection. Further, the paper suggests that conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which 
typically aim to foster investment in the future generation, and employment creation 
measures, which can help transform the livelihood opportunities for the present generation, 
need not be viewed as substitutes.  Both measures also mitigate current levels of poverty 
and/or inequality. It suggests that, in the context of current programming frameworks, PEPs 
can effectively address both chronic and transient poverty, whereas conventional CCTs 
principally target chronic poverty.
3 Section 5 of the paper focuses on issues relating to the 
design and implementation of public employment programmes framed within a long-term 
development framework.  This Section explores how the design of the programme will need  
to balance different programme objectives and address trade-offs.  It provides examples  
from various innovative public employment programmes.  The Annexes provide additional 
programming tools and guidance on employment impact assessments and a checklist for 
planning an EG and locating EG within global and national rights based framework. 
The paper does not seek to put forward a unique ‘implementation model’ of an EG,  
as the nature of the unemployment problem, the amount of fiscal space available, the types  
of infrastructure/service deficits, and programme priorities and trade-offs will vary across 
countries and over time.   Working Paper  5 
 
2  THE CASE FOR AN EMPLOYMENT FOCUS FOR  
CRISIS MITIGATION AND RECOVERY 
While there are few systematic international comparisons of pre and post crisis situations, 
analyses suggest that the impacts of a crisis can be deep and enduring, particularly on 
employment and poverty levels (Van der Hoeven, and Lubker 2008, ILO 2008, 2009, OECD 
2008b).
4 Studies analysing the differences in the speed with which countries recover also  
point to the important role that employment-focused policies play for impact mitigation and 
recovery.
5   In particular, simulations and the experience of past crises suggest that the greater 
the employment orientation of recovery measures, the stronger the stimulus for the real 
economy.
6  Further, in the context of the current crisis, preliminary assessments of large-scale 
social assistance suggest that such pro-poor ‘stabilisers’ may have been good not only for the 
poor, but also for the overall health of the economy. While the case for public employment 
programmes in crisis contexts is recognised, a quick review of the advantages of direct 
employment creation as part of stimulus and crisis recovery policy packages is useful: 
  PEPs can be speedily phased in and be cost-effective:  e.g., Kostzer (2008) and 
Tcherneva and Wray (2005) point to the experience of Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas 
de Hogar Desocupados
 (PJJHD),  introduced during the 2001 crisis, which showed 
that a massive employment programme could be implemented in a relatively 
short time and that a federally funded programme could be speedily administered 
locally with the participation of non-profit /non-governmental institutions.
 7   
  PEPS are self-targeting by design:  self-targeting public employment 
programmes and unconditional transfers (World Bank, 2008b) are probably 
preferable during crisis.  Ravallion (2008) points to the common drawback of 
targeted cash transfer schemes, which is that they tend to be relatively 
unresponsive to changes in the need for assistance. A previously ineligible 
household that is hit by  unemployment of the main breadwinner, for example, 
may find it difficult to get help from such schemes. A reassessment of eligibility  
in the wake of a crisis is necessary in such cases.
8  
  
  PEPs have less effect on inflation than measures that aim for a general 
expansion in aggregate demand and that only boost incomes, since 
employment programmes directly target the unemployed and affect both 
aggregate demand and supply, the later through the expansion of infrastructure, 
goods and services.
9 
  PEPs can help to stabilise local development and help to lay foundations for 
new growth:  Public job creation “may also be the only effective way to aid those  
among the long-term unemployed who are less skilled and less well educated” if the 
objective is to enable them to work while also helping to ‘crowd-in’ local investment 
through the provision of needed infrastructure and services.  Investment programmes 
can also help to pave the way for recovery by addressing infrastructure bottlenecks 
and stimulating investments in new sectors (e.g., green investments and jobs).
10 
  PEPs reduce the depreciation of human capital: Unemployment is typically 
associated with the depreciation of skills, motivation and work habits.  
By employing those who would otherwise be unemployed and by offering 6  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
training and education, PEPs can help to maintain and even to appreciate  
human capital. (Tcherneva and Wray, 2005). 
2.1  LESSONS FOR CRISIS PROGRAMME DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION: 
Important though these measures have been in mitigating the impacts of past and recent 
crises, most countries have generally been institutionally and financially unprepared for the 
extent and depths of financial/economic crises. This has led some to argue that ‘crises will 
always be with us’ and that the state needs a permanent, flexible and more holistic approach 
to safety nets to respond to a sudden expansion in beneficiaries newly thrown into 
unemployment and poverty and  to address the impacts of the crisis that often persist  
long after growth has resumed.
11 
Where possible, these programmes should fit into current institutional implementation 
frameworks.  Policy makers and practitioners will always have to grapple with trade-offs 
between speed and effectiveness. Moving too quickly to implement PEPs can lead to the 
production of low-quality assets and services that will likely ultimately undermine impact  
and political support. Having a longer-term planning perspective and mechanisms to quickly 
mobilise technical capacity, though, can help to mitigate some of the trade-offs and to 
strengthen capacities for implementation.  Studies on PEPs implemented during previous 
contexts also suggest that programmes could have been even more effective if they had been 
better designed and monitored (Bechterman and Islam, 2001). This is easier to do where there 
are not many new programmes.  
In order to create long-term impact, programmes also need to focus on identified 
development priorities and forward-looking investments to promote productive jobs  
and economic opportunities.
12 Programmes focusing on service provision can be initiated 
relatively more speedily (see Argentina’s PJJHD programme) and potentially have a  
greater multiplier impact.
13 
Household survival strategies appear to draw significant numbers of women to PEPs.
14 
However, programme design has not always been ‘gender-aware’ (some, for example, focused 
mostly on construction projects and lacked child care facilities). In terms of focus areas, PEPs 
could incorporate an understanding of household survival strategies and potentially help to 
put existing livelihood activities on a firmer footing through investments in community 
infrastructure and services.
15  
2.2  FACILITATING RECOVERY:  
As Devereux (2006) pointed out, the effect of public employment programmes on poverty 
reduction is “directly proportional to the scale of the programme (the number and duration 
of jobs provided), the proportion of the budget allocated to labour costs (also known as the 
‘alpha-ratio’), and the level of income transferred (the wage rate).”  However, this presents 
policy makers with a difficult trade-off.  At the household level, “tiny transfers equal tiny 
impacts, but moderate transfers can have major impacts” (Devereux 2002b: 672).  
Employment programmes typically try to cover large numbers of poor people, at a wage  
that will facilitate self-targeting without distortion of the labour market. In some instances, 
though, this has meant that incomes generated under the programmes were insufficient to 
cover the basic needs of the beneficiaries (ESCAP, 2002/03).  Such programmes also  
need to be combined with other social protection measures.
16  Working Paper  7 
 
As the recovery begins, there is often political and economic pressure to phase out public 
works/employment and employment guarantee programmes. Yet this pressure needs to be 
resisted, and decisions regarding phasing out need to be based on a concrete assessment of 
labour markets and the strength of the recovery, not simplistic measures like resumed growth 
or stock market recovery.  The role that these programmes will play during and post recovery 
will depend largely on the amount of ‘surplus labour’ that was available before the crisis and 
how effectively the programmes revived investment and private sector job creation. If the 
surplus were low, one would expect most labour to be reabsorbed into employment as the 
economy recovers.  
The main challenge here is that the recovery of employment generally lags behind the 
recovery of the economy. Further, when there have been high structural unemployment,  
many working poor and an involuntarily underemployed population prior to the crisis,  
there is no reason to believe that the recovery will address these dimensions of the labour 
market, particularly if the crisis has been prolonged and has added to the already significant 
ranks of informal workers.  Hence, there may be a need for PEPs to continue post recovery. 
Such programmes ideally should be a component of a longer-term employment  
and growth recovery package for inclusive growth. 
3  THE GENERAL CASE FOR AN EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE  
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
While employment and job creation are increasingly recognized as being central to poverty 
reduction,
17 creating a sufficient number of jobs solely through market-driven mechanisms can 
be a challenge even in the best of times, particularly in the face of globalisation, financial and 
trade liberalisation, technical change and economic restructuring.  For example, the ADB 
(2006) points out that “during the 1980s, a 3 per cent growth rate of output in the People’s 
Republic of China was needed to induce a 1 per cent increase in employment. In the 1990s,  
a growth rate of almost 8 per cent was needed to achieve the same result.” 
While employment per se was increasing in most regions when the crisis began, the 
quality of jobs created was such that, even in a period of progress such as in 2007, an average 
of four in ten workers were poor (ILO 2008a, 2009). A significant proportion of the jobs being 
created involved ‘under-employment’ and/or were ‘precarious’, and without benefits and 
protections.
18 Further, although there had been progress in the trend in working poverty and 
vulnerable work over the past many years, both were expected to increase sharply as a result 
of the recent economic crisis.
19 
In addition to the effects of the recent crises on food, fuel and finance, emerging evidence 
suggests that some trends, if not addressed, are likely to increase the vulnerability of systems 
and countries already reeling from the recent crises. The WEF Global Risk Report (2010) 
identifies fiscal crises and unemployment, underinvestment in infrastructure and chronic 
disease among the pivotal areas of risk. Significant levels of inequality also pose a challenge  
to efforts to reduce poverty. 
Because there are few unemployment benefits and/or social security schemes in most 
developing countries, large social assistance programmes including a directed approach to 
job creation and improvement in the conditions to sustain the livelihoods of the poor are 8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
attracting attention to manage shocks—which, as indicated above, some observers believe 
will be increasingly frequent—and to make the process and/or outcomes of growth more 
inclusive.  In this regard, while labour market policies and an increased focus on education 
are important, there needs to be a clear focus on ensuring integration into the labour market 
and providing assistance particularly for poor, underemployed and unskilled workers.  This is 
based on the understanding that the effective functioning of the labour market is a central 
factor dynamically linking the economy to the well-being of individuals and households in 
modern societies and that, in many instances, labour markets do not appear to work for the 
poor, as evidenced by significant levels of precarious employment, working poverty, and 
underemployment. 
Although public works have been initiated mostly during crisis and phased out 
thereafter, there is strong reason to support a transition toward a more comprehensive, 
long-term approach to public employment programmes to ensure a flexible response  
and to strengthen state capacities to deliver programmes. Experience from emerging 
countries suggests that an appropriate framework in this regard is one where the state not 
only establishes a longer-term development planning framework, but also takes on the  
role of an ‘Employer of Last Resort’ (ELR). 
Further, although the case for the state to take on a role as an ELR has been made mostly 
for industrial countries, there are now arguments that ELR would in fact have a much stronger 
effect on the economies of low-income, ‘labour surplus’ developing countries, where the poor 
could help to alleviate shortages of infrastructure, goods and services through work.  Mitchell 
and Wray (1998, 2005) propose using the analogy of a buffer stock to understand the role 
played by the state when it acts as an ELR and guarantees a job to everyone willing and able to 
work at a given wage.  During periods of economic growth, the private sector will hire people 
from the pool of unemployed (at a higher wage). During downturns, though, the government 
can enforce the minimum wage by maintaining the buffer stock and therefore raising the 
wage currently being earned by the working poor in the informal economy.   In this way, it can 
provide a floor for securing a minimum standard of living even as it helps to maintain overall 
wage and price stability.
20 
While there is a strong case for supporting direct employment creation even without 
formal reference to a rights-based framework (see Annex 3 for a rights-based approach to an 
employment guarantee), as the framing of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in 
India
21 demonstrates, a rights-based approach can have powerful ramifications for financing 
frameworks, for accountability mechanisms and participatory engagement, as well as for 
longer-term planning and capacity development necessary for the implementation of an  
EG approach. See Amita Sharma (2010).   
3.1 ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND REGIONAL BENEFITS OF AN EMPLOYMENT  
GUARANTEE APPROACH 
Employment Guarantee (EG) programmes have multi-faceted economic, social and regional 
benefits (see Table 1).  In general, an EG programme can contribute to picking up the shortfall 
in the case of cyclical and/or structural unemployment, creating a floor for wage levels, and  
maintaining wage and price stability. A second set of benefits relates to the potential  
of these programmes to act as ‘stabilisers’ for the local economy as well as for the  
broader macro-economy. Working Paper  9 
 
TABLE 1 
Advantages of ELR Policies and Employment Guarantee Programmes  
(based on Kostzer 2004 and 2008)  
4  PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
Public works and employment programmes (PEPs) have typically have been part of a menu  
of social assistance—typically short-term—programmes. Since PEPs in fact straddle social 
assistance, infrastructure/service provision and employment-related interventions, though,  
the connections among these need to be explored to identify how social and economic 
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4.1  COMPLEMENTARITIES BETWEEN PUBLIC SECTOR AND  
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
There has been a tendency to mix ideology into discussions about the role of the private  
sector versus the role of the public sector in job creation. In fact, both have a role to play. 
Ideally, employment creation programming should explicitly seek to identify potential 
complementarities as well as the potential for PEPs to stimulate or ‘crowd in’ private sector 
investment.   Furthermore, a PEP does not preclude, but rather complements, more traditional 
approaches to job creation, such as the promotion of economic growth, sectoral interventions, 
enterprise development, and a focus on inter-enterprise ties that offer the potential for rapid 
growth and the creation of decent work. A PEP may contribute to the identification of direct 
employment-intensive investment policies and/or the strengthening of services to and ties 
with more employment-intensive sectors. Other relevant actions and policies include:  policies 
promoting investments in education, training, institutional and human capacities; physical 
infrastructure development so as to increase productivity and competitiveness; increasing the 
capacity of the private sector to contribute to job creation; implementing targeted active 
labour market policies and programmes; and ensuring improved governance of labour 
markets through improved participation of worker and employer representatives in the 
formulation of employment policy. Designed appropriately, an employment guarantee can 
contribute to the creation of assets and infrastructure that themselves help to increase the 
productivity and competitiveness of the private sector.   
Both the private sector and society at large can benefit from the work experience gained 
as well as from the training (and/or educational support) received by beneficiaries of public 
employment programmes. Further, as indicated earlier, given the likely slow return to 
normality after the current crisis, a variety of measures may be in order to ‘crowd in’ private 
sector development through public investment. This can generate jobs and compensate  
for private sector deficits in job creation, particularly with regard to addressing structural 
unemployment and the pool of jobless individuals who are unlikely to be absorbed into  
the labour market even after the economy recovers. 
4.2  EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEES, CASH TRANSFERS AND A  
SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR   
Social protection is an ‘umbrella concept’ that describes various socio-economic policies and 
programmes ranging from formal social security and social insurance and rights at work to 
social assistance programmes and transfers focused on the vulnerable, the poor and the 
unorganised. (For differences in how social protection is viewed, see definitions in Annex 1).   
Developing countries often have ‘dual systems’ of social protection with social assistance 
programmes encompassing a patchwork of targeted initiatives with varying degrees of 
coverage compared to the situation of formal sector workers. Although the need for a more 
holistic and coordinated approach to social protection for the poor is being recognized 
(particularly with regard to the adoption of a more dynamic approach to poverty reduction 
which incorporates an understanding of multi-dimensional ‘traps’, vulnerabilities and risks), 
there is a danger that the focus will be limited to targeted social assistance even though 
emerging evidence suggests that targeted social assistance is a complement to more  
universal programmes, not a substitute (UNRISD 2009). Working Paper  11 
 
That said, while the overall focus needs to be on moving toward more inclusive social 
protection systems, the objective of this discussion is to identify complementarities/trade-offs 
between different social assistance programmes themselves. Marcus (2007) and others point 
out that the role of social assistance typically involves three main functions: (i) to help protect 
basic levels of consumption among those in poverty or at danger of falling into poverty;  
(ii) to facilitate investment in human and other productive assets, which alone can provide 
escape from persistent and intergenerational poverty; and (iii) to strengthen the agency  
of those in poverty so that they can overcome their predicament. 
Different regions have emphasised one or another function to a greater or lesser extent 
for historical and institutional reasons. See Kabeer and Cook (2009) for a global overview and 
for references to regional studies that were part of the research initiative.
22  Barrientos et al. 
(2009) point out that, for income transfer programmes in middle-income countries in Latin 
America, the earliest referent is Uruguay’s Family Allowances Scheme (initiated in 1943) as well 
as non-contributory pension schemes in Costa Rica, Chile and Brazil and that, since the late-
1990s and the 2000s, income transfers have increasingly become a means to tackle poverty 
and vulnerability. Particularly well known are the conditional cash transfers that combine a 
transfer for income/consumption support with incentives for long-term investment in human 
capital.
23  It is argued that, in Africa, relief and humanitarian assistance in response to food 
insecurity, conflict and natural disasters have contributed to defining the model applied in 
many low-income countries.  South and South-East Asia appear to exhibit great variation 
within countries and over time. In India and, to some extent, in Bangladesh, poverty reduction 
programmes have often focused on public works and school feeding/mid-day meal 
programmes, that is, they have focussed more on promotive than on protective types  
of social protection (Davies & McGregor, 2009).  
Most programmes form part of a broader social policy umbrella. For example, with regard 
to CCT programmes that tend to place a greater emphasis on the consumption smoothing 
effects, beneficiaries are typically linked to a variety of ‘complementary’ programmes to 
promote ‘graduation’
24 and/or to foster empowerment. These complementary services  
range from literacy and social/psychosocial support to professional training and income-
generation programmes.   There may be reasons to be concerned about the efficacy of two 
of the most frequently mentioned channels for income generation: microfinance and 
training programmes. New studies have found that microcredit was not very effective in 
reducing poverty, even if it did allow some people to overcome the barriers posed by start-
up costs.
25 While systematic information on ‘uptake’ for complementary programmes is hard 
to get, Lindert et al. (2007) acknowledge that “all of these complementary services depend 
on a strong economy that produces jobs, demand, and income-generating opportunities.  
Simply improving the ‘employability’ or individual productivity of poor […] beneficiaries is 
not enough to ensure their sustainable graduation from poverty or the programme.” 
Depending upon the pattern of unemployment prevailing in the particular area, it may also 
be necessary to provide employment opportunities through directed job creation. Further,  
in many instances, some of the areas of services focused on by PEPs may also facilitate 
engagement in the programme itself, that is, services for children and the elderly may be 
critically important to single or working mothers who also benefit from child support grants 
or conditional cash transfers.
26 
Although job creation and economic empowerment must complement cash transfers  
and CCTs, conditional transfers are sometimes viewed as an alternative to public employment 
programmes. The reason is that public employment programmes are often viewed solely in 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
terms of their cash transfer component. Further, where PEPs are not sufficiently effective,  
it might presumably be better simply to change the conditions for receipt (e.g., to enrol 
children in school, etc.).
27 Yet these claims ignore the causes underlying many of the perceived 
shortcomings of PEPs and ways to address them. They also underestimate the non-monetary 
benefits of well-designed PEPs and the importance of complementary economic 
empowerment programmes for unconditional or conditional cash transfers.    
More important, there are no reasons that cash transfers and EGPs should be mutually 
exclusive. The beneficiary profile of the programmes may also differ to some extent—not 
everyone can work. Further, individuals may be more or less able to work over the life cycle, 
and, where entitlements to work are defined on a household basis, some households may find 
it difficult to live on the contributions of working members alone. In the case of Ethiopia’s 
PSNP, for example, there may be households that have one or more able-bodied adults and 
qualify for public works, but that cannot provide enough work-days to earn the full family 
allocation because of a high ratio of non-working to working members.  Also the situation for 
the household may change temporarily. In this instance, some programmes either explicitly 
classify households as labour-poor/scarce and entitle them to a cash transfer (e.g., Ethiopia’s 
PSNP) or, where such an option is not an integral part of the programme, beneficiaries may 
avail of programmes such as child support grants, disability grants or social pensions  
(e.g., South Africa).   Further, conditional cash transfers promote a social investment in  
the next generation, while PEPs can help to transform the livelihood conditions of the current 
generation by facilitating both investment in skills and productive infrastructure.
28 As the 
programme approach adopted by Argentina shows, there are also potential dangers in 
adopting an ‘either/or’ approach, particularly when young urban women/mothers with 
children areas are concerned.
29  
As Salazar-Xirinachs (2008) points out, labour market interventions that combine 
employment and social protection in poor countries are more effective and fiscally affordable 
than programmes that are perceived to be ‘pure’ social welfare programmes.  The challenge 
consists in achieving a combination of social protection and employment that responds to  
the given character and extent of unemployment and conditions of poverty, yet also to the 
eventual needs of families throughout their life cycles. It will also need to build on existing 
institutional strengths and systems.   
Here, the ILO- and WHO-led campaign for a ‘global social protection floor’ (SPF) may offer 
some guidance for identifying possibilities for synergies and integration. On the one hand, SPF 
activities seek to “work on means to ensure the availability of goods and services in the areas of 
health, water and sanitation and housing, education, food and related information etc. At the 
same time, the SPF activities will secure rights and transfers that guarantee effective access to 
these goods and services for all throughout the life cycle”( ILO and WHO, 2009).  In this regard, the 
ILO and others see “income support combined with employment guarantees through public 
works programmes for the working-age poor who cannot earn sufficient income on the labour 
market” as being a part of the social transfer component of the social floor. Also see OECD 
Policy Guidance Note on Social Protection, 2009.    
A focus on operational synergies and systems is also critical here because there are often 
separate information systems for different social programme components which do not ‘talk to 
each other’ and thus miss out on exploring complementarities and reducing overall costs of Working Paper  13 
 
programme delivery which can be leveraged through an integrated programme.  In Ethiopia, 
for example, there are separate lists for public works and direct transfers, whereas, in South 
Africa, where the unemployed are recruited on a project basis and where social grants are 
managed by a different department, there is no central, provincial or other database for 
EPWP workers. Further, in many cases, entitlements to work are defined on the basis of 
households that do not fall into neat, black-and-white categories of those with and without 
labour. In the context of the PSNP, Sharp et al. (2006, pp. 46-47) propose an integrated list or 
single registry that also includes information on workers and dependents in the household 
size; this can help when assessing how much each (targeted) household could receive 
(according to need) and how much they could contribute to community development  
and public works (according to ability).    
An analogous approach would combine support for households that encompasses child 
grants and conditional cash transfers (investment in children) and support for investments  
to transform current livelihoods through labour opportunities and entitlements.
30 
While it is important to explore the connections with other social protection and 
assistance programmes, it is also important not to view a PEP as if it were merely social 
protection and assistance. PEPs straddle both social protection and employment-related 
interventions.
31 Even if a programme emerges from a ‘workfare’ context, its contribution 
cannot be reduced to its role as a supplement to income or consumption smoothing.  There 
should be particular consideration of how such programmes can not only improve the terms 
under which beneficiaries enter the job market and become economically empowered, but 
also how labour markets can be made responsive to the poor.   
4.3  EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEES AND ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 
Particularly over the last two decades, a number of countries have implemented various active 
labour market policies (hereafter ALMP) to combat unemployment.  These include job search 
assistance to increase matching efficiency; wage subsidies for the private or public sector to 
retain workers and increase the employment prospects of specific target groups; and investing 
in human capital through formal training programmes to develop skills and to increase 
productivity.
32  While forward-looking, targeted training—particularly on-the-job training—
helps workers to get access to jobs, to better position themselves to keep a job, or to adjust  
to changing job and industry requirements, a singular focus on training may fall short as a 
general approach to address the needs of the long-term unemployed when structural 
unemployment is high or labour demand is insufficient (Betcherman and Dar, 2004;  
Lindert et al., 2007). As Wray (2007) points out: 
 
Hyman Minsky always argued that public policy that favours education and training over job 
creation puts ‘the cart before the horse’ and is unlikely to succeed. First, it lays the blame on the 
unemployed, which can be demoralizing and can validate public perceptions regarding 
undesirable characteristics supposedly endemic within the disadvantaged population. It tells  
the poor that they must change their characteristics—including their behaviour—before they 
deserve to work. However, those without jobs might not view such changes as desirable or even 
possible. Second, it can require a long time to see results; the ‘gestational’ period to produce  
a worker is at least 16 years for developing nations [...] Further, a dynamic economy is always 
leaving old skills behind and demanding new ones. At any point, there will be a permanent, 
sizeable, pool of those with inappropriate skills and education, even if many individuals are able 
to transition out of the pool in a timely fashion. Third, as mentioned, there is the danger that the 14  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
retrained will face a job shortage so that at best they simply displace previously employed 




By drawing in people who have often never been part of the workforce, well designed 
employment guarantee programmes can increase their ‘employability’ and/or facilitate 
their re-entry into the private sector, suggesting that, in many instances, the private sector 
prefers to hire people who already have work experience or are working rather than the 
long-term unemployed.  
Such programmes appear to be particularly important for poor women, who also often 
form a significant share of the beneficiaries. Depending upon the country context, they may 
have never worked outside the home or may have found it difficult to do so because of care 
responsibilities that were not as easily managed in other work environments or because of a 
relative lack of experience.  The significance attached to work is both social and practical; in the 
context of Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Deocupados, many beneficiaries regarded the 
work made available through the employment programmes as ‘the’ way to contribute to 
society and community. Nevertheless, the ‘compensation activity’ to be done was particularly 
valued in two types of situations: 1) work in productive cooperative organizations and 
undertakings where not only the work itself was agreeable, but also where the experience 
could enable the women to do similar work later at private companies; and 2) job training 
courses where the focus was on the acquisition of new skills (Rodríguez Enríquez, 2007).    
5  DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN EMPLOYMENT  
GUARANTEE PROGRAMME 
The design of an EG programme typically involves trade-offs and compromises.  
The following sections attempt to give guidance and examples of the most common ones 
faced by policy makers. It is important not to lose sight of the nature of the unemployment and 
underemployment problem that the programme is trying to address,
34 so that the inevitable 
compromises do not result in a programme unable to solve the very problem it was intended 
to address.  These programmes are always designed in a political context and the one 
requirement is that the design be politically acceptable.  The current economic crisis has 
opened the political space in many countries for EGP or EG-type programmes and a 
development perspective should also inform the design of the programmes.  
5.1  NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK: FROM PUBLIC WORKS TO EMPLOYMENT  
GUARANTEE PROGRAMMES 
With regard to designing public employment programmes, valuable experience and capacity 
can be drawn from different types of public works programmes, including labour-based 
infrastructure investment programmes.  McCord (2008) presents the following typology:  
(i) PWPs offering a single short-term episode of employment (Type A); large-scale government 
employment programmes that may offer some form of employment guarantee (Type B); 
programmes promoting the labour intensification of government infrastructure spending 
(Type C); and programmes that enhance employability (Type D).  The focus of this paper is Working Paper  15 
 
closest to types B and C in this typology, but particularly to B. Further, as indicated earlier,  
the focus is not really on PWs programmes per se, but on PEPs framed with regard to an 
understanding of nature of poverty and labour market dynamics in the developing countries 
concerned. The programmes would also allow for a mix of services, infrastructure programmes 
and different implementation mechanisms.  
This change in focus involves making some conceptual and programming shifts: first,  
it should be clear that, in this paper, public employment programmes involve moving from 
supply-driven infrastructure investment programs, where the objective is to create new jobs 
by optimizing the employment impact of already allocated infrastructure investments,  
to a demand-driven approach, where the objective is to respond to unmet demand for 
employment opportunities. This implies a major evolution in approach, time-frame,  
and direction.  Framing PEPs in the context of an EG allows for integrating planning and 
accountability mechanisms that are critical for success.  The shift from a supply-driven  
to a demand-driven approach also allows further scaling up of employment-intensive 
infrastructure programmes to include new areas of intervention (such as expanding  
public and social services) and to extend these interventions, thereby providing a  
more comprehensive response to unemployment and working poverty. 
In principle, the adoption of a full-fledged EG effectively guarantees a job to everyone, 
picking up all residual unemployment in the economy, i.e., those who are unable to find work 
within the private or public sectors (i.e., it hires from the bottom). However, this definition 
nevertheless raises a number of questions both of interpretation and of the degree to which 
certain features of an EG can be modified or adapted without undermining its benefits and 
efficacy. For example, to what extent can the principle of universal coverage be restricted to 
apply to only certain categories of the population (for example, only rural populations, or 
confined to a given region of a country)?  How much work, and what quality of work, is to be 
provided, and for how long?   And, of course, the whole prospect of providing a job to everyone 
willing and able to work raises in the minds of most the question of affordability.
  
While there are few full-fledged employment guarantees in place, some forward-looking 
and/or innovative approaches offer lessons. India has a 100-day guarantee, with strong 
accountability mechanisms, for rural families. Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas was launched during  
a crisis and was central in mitigating impact and contributing to recovery. It was initially 
formulated as a ‘universal’ programme (Galasso & Ravallion 2003) and, as Tabbush (2008) 
points out, it associated social policy with a rights-based rationale—a right to social 
inclusion—as expressed in the slogan ‘no Argentine family without income.’35 Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme, while not an EG, demonstrates the greater effects on 
development from a new design promoting ‘a gradual shift away from a system dominated 
by emergency humanitarian aid to productive safety net system resources via multi-year 
framework.’ South Africa’s EPWP has the potential to be framed as an EG.36 It also highlights 
the potential to go beyond traditional areas of focus for public works to address, for 
example, social services and the environment. See Tables 2 and 3 for a snapshot  
of some of the programmes. 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary of Key Public Employment Programmes 
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5.2  FEASIBILITY, AFFORDABILITY AND FINANCING OF AN EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE 
Once there is agreement about the desirability of providing an employment guarantee,  
the next question that confronts policy makers is whether it is feasible in the context of the 
country’s macro-economy and whether such an ambitious objective can be affordable.   
Wray (2007) and a number of economists who have studied and advocated ELR policies 
argue that, in principle, ‘Sovereign governments can always financially afford to provide jobs 
to unemployed workers.’ The argument in favour of affordability of ELR for ‘sovereign’ nations 
is based on monetary theory known as ‘functional finance’.
37  i.e., simply put, there is no  
a priori constraint for a sovereign government to use deficit spending to fund an employment 
guarantee programme.  i.e., government spending in sovereign currency systems is not limited 
by the ability of the state to ‘raise’ revenue.   
Others also point to the experiences of countries that, without any talk of financial 
constraints, bailed out their financial sectors during the recent financial crises.  However, even 
proponents of this view admit that there need to be financing modalities for those developing 
countries that have neither sovereign nor floating currencies. Papadimitriou (2008) points  
out that, for economies lacking monetary sovereignty and with fixed exchange rates, other 
financing modalities can be used: “‘Functional finance’ can be replaced with ‘sound finance’ for 
non-sovereign currency countries with floating exchange rates. A combined modality of sound 
finance, together with international assistance—such as ODA for low-income and post-conflict 
countries—can be an appropriate financing mechanism.” Some countries, such as Trinidad and 
Tobago, have used windfall profits and revenues from oil or other natural resources to create 
special funds for such programmes,
38 although a common danger has been using the jobs 
provided for political patronage.  
This paper holds that a public finance approach needs to identify fiscal space
39 in each 
case and to consider the macroeconomic and developmental benefits of such programmes in 
order to explore the longer-term sustainability of those programmes.  A case must consider 
that decision makers’ choices always concern competing uses of public funds. As Tcherneva 
(2004) points out, “While governments are not operationally constrained, it is still important 
which programmes they choose to finance.  Furthermore, as sole suppliers of the currency, 
they also have the responsibility for maintaining its value.”
 40   
Further, it is important for poor countries to reflect EG priorities in national planning 
frameworks. The fact that employment and decent work are now an integral part of the MDGs 
provides a new opportunity to do this.
41  Ample evidence demonstrates that job creation and 
decent work provide the one best way to reduce poverty. The EG, while not a magic bullet, is a 
key complement to other routes to poverty reduction and employment creation.  As a tool for 
this allocation process, it would be useful to have a clear picture of how national budgets and 
public investment plans are currently broken down according to government department  
and sector of economic activity; this would facilitate a clear national debate about the relative 
priority of employment among current areas of budgetary allocations.  
Research based on projections and data drawn from actual employment guarantee 
programmes or other direct, more limited job creation programmes (see Table 3) show that 
their costs range from less than 1 to 3 per cent of GDP, suggesting that the programmes have 
indeed been affordable. 18  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
Further, in order to inform public debate, it is important to have an accurate view of 
programme costs, cost savings and benefits in order to better prioritize within the overall 
budgetary process.  This includes factoring in costs of addressing existing unemployment— 
e.g., unemployment insurance and/or other social transfers as well as costs associated with 
poor health, greater time and other pressures on women, crime, etc.—that an EG would be 
expected to reduce or eliminate (Wray, 2007). 
TABLE 3 



















42  200,000  70,000  16,000,000  1.3%  0.44%  0.20* 
Indonesia: PK (1998/99)  1,481,481  181,818 92,000,000 1.6% 0.20%  0.20
India: NREGA**  (2006/7)  21,200,000  4,109,091 427,000,000 5.0% 0.96%  0.30
India: NREGA***   
(2008/9 estimate) 
     15%  3  1.0 
Ireland: CEP (1990s)  41,000  n/a 1,400,000 2.9% n/a  0.18
Ethiopia: PSNP  (2006/7)  1,500,000  n/a 31,000,000 4.8% n/a  2.00
Senegal: AGETIP  (2004)  21,000  n/a  4,500,000  0.5%  n/a  0.80 
Usa:  new deal programmes 
(1933‐1940 average)   n/a  n/a  53,000,000  3.4‐8.9%  n/a  3.9 
Jefes: Argentina**** (2003)  2,210,000  n/a  17,000,000  13.0%  n/a  0.90 
Source: McCord 2007 (notes on estimates also from original source). 
# The total number of jobs created, i.e., the number of workers participating in the programme, assuming  
that each worker has access to one job. Note that this figure gives no indication of duration of employment.  
The total number of person years of work created assumes 220 workdays per annum. 
* This figure rises to 0.47% if the funding allocation for infrastructure is included, however, since this is not 
additional funding, but existing funds that are to be used more labour-intensively, this figure has not been  
used in the table, and the 0.20 per cent represents only social and environmental allocations for direct government 
employment activity. 
** NREGA 2006/7 only operational in 200 out of 600 districts.   
*** Indicative figures only based on assumption that programme is taken to scale as anticipated, i.e., programme is 
extended to all 600 districts by 2009, total cost anticipated to be approximately 1 per cent of GDP, and 
approximately 15 per cent of the total labour force is likely to be employed. 
**** The Jefes programme has a small companion programme, the Programmea de Emergencie Laboral (PEL), 
which is similar in terms of benefits but has slightly differing eligibility criteria, and so the data here is not 
representative of total PWP expenditure or performance in Argentina. 
 
An assessment of multiplier effects is also important, since they will reduce the actual 
funding required over the lifetime of the programme.
43 
In order to ensure political acceptance of the EG approach, it must be presently precisely 
as what its title says it is: a measure of last resort. This means that there should simultaneously 
be other, complementary avenues of job creation. As part of this process, it is important to 
analyse the effect of the government’s existing public investment programme on employment 
(i.e., the number of jobs created) and to use more labour-intensive methods to amplify this 
effect wherever these methods are technically feasible and cost-effective. This would leave  
an EG with a commensurately smaller employment shortfall to pick up. Working Paper  19 
 
Programmes implemented amid extreme poverty and underemployment may well 
become ‘employers of choice’ because they offer better wages and working conditions than 
alternatives in the informal economy. While this may be desirable in some contexts, this effect 
should be carefully planned. 
5.3  TARGETED OR UNIVERSAL? 
An EG, in theory, provides universal coverage and is self-targeting. It should provide coverage 
to every adult willing and able to work at a determined wage rate. As indicated earlier, though, 
an EG will still compete with other government priorities for available resources even if it is 
affordable. This is probably one of the main reasons that all countries have applied some kind 
of targeting and rationing of employment opportunities. In India, for example, the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) covers only the rural population and a family can 
receive a maximum of 100 workdays in employment opportunities annually.
 Under Argentina’s 
Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar, which provided only part-time (fifty per cent) work, benefits were 
restricted to heads of households with children under 18 years of age, a person with a 
handicap, or a pregnant woman.
44  
Although universal nationwide coverage may not be a financial constraint per se, there 
seem to be two main reasons why EG programmes are rarely launched nationwide.  Although 
economists who advocate for an EG may demonstrate that universal coverage is affordable, 
politicians, policy makers and the public at large will often oppose such initiatives, except in 
periods of extreme crisis, because they believe, regardless of justification, that an EG is beyond 
their country’s means. This political economic reality implies that it is wise to roll out a 
programme in graduated phases to ensure accountability and effective implementation.  
At the same time, it is important to try to sway public opinion and national and international 
policies in favour of public job creation as a last resort.  
There are also differing views on whether to restrict a public employment programme to 
rural or to urban areas. Programmes such as Argentina’s Plan Jefes de Hogar or South Africa’s 
Expanded Public Works Programme (which is not really an employment guarantee) do not 
restrict participants as a result of rural or urban location. India’s National Rural Employment 
Guarantee is exclusively rural.
 Some argue that focusing an ELR exclusively on urban or major 
metropolitan regions could lead to increased rural-to-urban migration in many instances if 
there is not a corresponding focus on creating jobs in rural areas (unless, of course, 
unemployment is largely in urban areas). In the current economic crisis, there have been some 
calls in India, with its many workers laid off in urban areas, to implement an urban employment 
guarantee scheme to complement the NREGA, since the rural sector has been absorbing the 
shock of urban distress, which has only compounded the employment crisis already prevalent 
in rural areas.
  
5.4  PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The question of institutional arrangements is important when deciding on allocation of 
investment and regular budget resources for a PEP. Typically, one might expect that resources 
for job creation should be allocated to the budget of the ministry of labour or employment. 
While this ministry or governmental department likely plays a key role in employment, public 
employment programmes will also be developed by other governmental departments such as 
those of public works, rural or urban development, forestry, water resources, environmental 
protection, education, health and social services, to name a few.
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governments will have a key role to play in identifying priorities and implementing and/or 
coordinating the employment programmes of other actors.
46 Therefore, funding for an EG 
should include regular and investment resources allocated to those departments and levels  
of governments which have the capacity for initiating job creation, and they should receive 
incentives to do this. Furthermore, the ministry of finance or planning usually plays a key role 
in the allocation and monitoring of the public investment budget.  A well-designed budget 
with built-in incentives for job creation will help ensure that the EGPs provide useful, good 
infrastructure and human capital development. These assets will, in turn, help ensure that  
the ELR approach enjoys public favour and is sustainable.   
Whereas there is a body of literature
47 demonstrating the economic and social benefits, 
viability and affordability of EG programmes, most case studies refer to middle-income and 
industrialized economies (Argentina, India, Indonesia, South Africa, the United States, etc.), and 
there are few examples of a true employment guarantee in the LDCs. Although developing 
countries may have weak administrative capacities, especially at the local level, this need not 
be an insurmountable obstacle, particularly in light of their often extensive experience with 
public works and employment programmes. This experience with PWPs can be a stepping-
stone for establishing a more broadly-based employment guarantee. Some of the guiding 
principles and recommendations to help developing countries better capitalize on past 
experience with public works programs and strengthen their capacities for  
implementing an employment guarantee include: 
  Ensure that robust political support for the programme is sustained. 
  Ensure that all participating technical departments have strong ownership of  
and incentives for supporting and implementing the programme within clearly 
defined mandates and responsibilities.48 If this is done, the EG administration  
will not become a separate parallel mechanism for building and maintaining 
infrastructure and basic services, including social services. 
  Prevent the programmes from being viewed as ‘make work’, endemically corrupt 
or of poor quality. 
  Design and build into the programme ongoing training and capacity building  
for government implementing departments and allow for the contracting of  
non-governmental and civil society groups as service providers.49 
  Be sensitive to the possibility of gender-differentiated, class and/or social group 
priorities for programmes and ensure participation and inclusive decision making; 
involve social partners (representatives of trade unions and employers’ 
associations) as well as relevant NGOs, community-based organisations and 
informal economy organisations in programme design and oversight (Shah, 2008). 
  Ensure that the design of public employment programmes is sensitive to  
and takes into account the existing livelihood strategies for the poor.50 
  Establish national, regional and global exchanges and peer review mechanisms to 
help developing countries share and learn from their mutual experience in order 
to make the PWP-EG transition. 
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Developing countries wishing to establish an EG programme could also benefit from  
the experience of their peers who have received ILO technical cooperation to implement 
Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes (EIIPs).
51 These programmes, building  
on a generation of Special Public Works Programmes and implemented in many countries 
throughout the world, involved a wide variety of infrastructural improvements in different 
technical sectors. These were initially rural projects such as water supply, reforestation, 
erosion control, small dam construction, irrigation, watershed management, feeder road 
construction and improvement, construction of buildings such as schools, health centres, 
and cereal banks; later, the programmes branched out to involve urban works such as slum 
upgrading, street paving, sanitation and drainage. If the programmes involved different 
technical sectors, they were typically the responsibility of a central government department 
or ministry (for example, ministry of labour or social development, or even a unit attached to 
the president’s office). To ensure high technical standards and reliable maintenance 
arrangements, the responsible technical department not only had to be involved, but also 
had to take responsibility for project selection (in coordination with beneficiaries), design, 
implementation (either through direct hire—or force account—labour or through 
community contracting arrangements), and maintenance. 
Since most infrastructure projects carried out under an EGP will involve relatively labour-
intensive methods and local labour, strong mechanisms for community involvement are 
necessary. Community contracting is one means of easing the labour management burdens  
on government departments and ensuring that rights and obligations between beneficiaries 
and the government implementing agency are clearly defined.
52  However, any contracting 
mechanisms, be they directly with the beneficiary community or through small-scale, labour-
based enterprises, will likely require intensive on-the-job training. This is reason for making an 
EG a permanent feature of a government’s employment policy rather than a temporary job 
creation programme created in response to a crisis. Here, training and capacity building  
would become an ongoing feature of the programme rather than a rushed and often 
ineffective effort to respond to ephemeral political demands.
53 
There should also be institutional arrangements to create incentives for government 
technical departments to buy into the EG, rather than allowing the central management  
unit to sidestep the mandate and authority of such departments.
54 In order to safeguard such 
ownership and create incentives, South Africa’s EPWP is implementing a wage incentive within 
government that will provide a fiscal incentive for all government departments, as well as 
provincial and local governments, to maximise employment creation for the poor as part of 
their mandate (see Box 1). 
The incentive would essentially cover the wage costs, at a fixed minimum daily wage,  
of employment created for the poor. This should in no way be confused with wage or 
employment subsidies given to the private sector with the intention of promoting job 
creation. This EPWP wage incentive, however, is only one of various available financing 
mechanisms, and the availability of other budgets will be a factor in containing costs and 
assisting the EG Programme. Other programmes are also designed to have a combination of 
budgets fund the full costs of the programme. The main advantage of this approach is that it 
improves accountability, as the party that funds the non-wage costs (usually a local body with 
better project oversight) has a strong interest in ensuring that the intended asset or services is 22  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
really provided.  Typically, the co-funding party has a specific mandate beyond employment 
creation and will pursue this mandate in order to ensure quality of work, timely completion, 
etc. If the programme is to be funded from a combination of budgets, there should be 
provisions for the required coordination to ensure that programmes are not delayed  
due to poor coordination or disputes between the different funding bodies. 
BOX 1 
Inter-governmental Wage Incentive (South Africa) 
In the first phase of the EPWP, funding was limited and provinces and municipalities were required to use 
their existing infrastructure grants to implement projects more labour-intensively and create additional 
employment in the process.  Many provinces and municipalities disliked this approach, which was seen as 
central government interference in the management of local government’s resources. Since they had little 
financial incentive in the form of additional resources for them to create employment, their participation in 
the programme was limited in some cases. 
To address this, the second phase of the EPWP will have a wage incentive for other government bodies 
to encourage more job creation. The EPWP wage incentive will be structured as an intergovernmental fiscal 
incentive that will allow all provinces and municipalities to reclaim a portion of the wage cost of employment 
created for the EPWP target group. The national government will provide R50 (US$5.00) for every person-day 
of work created by the responsible technical or local implementing agencies or government units, provided 
that proof is provided that workers were employed and that the actual wage paid was between R50 and 
R100 per day.  Provinces and municipalities will need to meet minimum eligibility requirements, which are 
based on minimum levels of employment creation based on existing conditional grants (see above).  
All eligible public bodies will receive an indicative allocation based on their past performance, but there  
will be no ceiling and those that exceed their targets will be able to claim above their existing allocations.  
In the first year, the incentive will be restricted to infrastructure-related activities, but it is the intention 
that it be made available to all government activities, implemented by all spheres of government in the 
second year. NGOs, CBOs and other non-profit organizations will be able to access the incentive in future 
years.  Projected estimates of the incentive to be paid are R465 million ($58 million) in the first year, 
increasing to R1.3 billion in the second and R2.3 billion in the third. It is expected to reach R5 billion per 
annum by the fifth year, which would result in 100 million person-days of employment created in that year. 
 
EGPs may always carry a certain institutional ambiguity and create institutional tension; 
this is linked to the multiple objectives that such programmes have, such as the creation of 
jobs and assets and the provision of social protection and social services. But, as mentioned 
above, this tension can be positive in that it may assist in balancing the multiple objectives. 
Institutional arrangements should simultaneously promote these multiple objectives.
55   
Many suitable projects typically fall within the mandates of local governments and this also 
needs to be considered in the design of institutional arrangements.  As also indicated earlier, 
ministries of labour or employment should play a key role, but not necessarily in the direct 
implementation of EG projects outside their fields of technical expertise or competence.   
Rather, these ministries should be encouraged to assist technical line ministries or departments 
in monitoring employment impacts, in coordinating consultation with employers’ and workers’ 
organisations, in ensuring oversight and transparency (e.g., through national employment 
commissions), and in overseeing adherence to applicable labour standards.  Working Paper  23 
 
5.5  STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY AND ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY 
Strong beneficiary participation, community oversight and involvement of social partners  
have long been emphasized as a means of ensuring transparency and support to improved 
management by public authorities.  Recent studies on the India’s NREGA point to the role that 
the Right to Information, institutionalised and external social audits, awareness raising and 
social mobilisation have been playing in calling attention to critical issues and grievances.  
In fact, the Right to Information Act (2005) had its roots in a social mobilization to make  
public the muster rolls of the public works programmes being implemented so as to be able to 
identify inclusion of fake beneficiaries and to address the denial of benefits to those who had 
actually worked (see MKSS, 2006, Jenkins and Goetz, 1999 and Menon, 2008). Further, given 
the rights-based framework underlying NREGA, the accountability dimensions have been 
further strengthened— e.g. pro-active disclosure of key NREGA-related documents and 
mandatory social audits as well as redressal mechanisms are key features of NREGA’s 
commitment to transparency and accountability (See GoI, MORD’s DRAFT NREGA: 
Transparency and Public Accountability Rules).  
Efforts to strengthen capacity and to mobilise populations in order to ensure 
accountability and delivery would well serve efforts to roll out a universal programme in 
countries or localities with limited capacities. Another mechanism for ensuring transparency 
and accountability is community contracting, which, for example, UN-Habitat has supported 
by in Sri Lanka and the ILO has supported in slum-upgrading programmes in Uganda and 
Tanzania. Although there are many facets of community contracting, the mechanism involves 
negotiations between the beneficiary community, represented by a democratically-elected 
community development committee, and the public authorities, leading to agreement  
on the nature of the infrastructure to be provided, the levels and modalities of remuneration, 
and the respective contributions of the community and the public authorities to 
implementation, operation and maintenance.
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5.6  INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT,  
FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Delivery mechanisms and instruments will likely vary by country and local context, depending 
on whether there is adequate technology and financial service infrastructure along with 
legislation permitting different payment methods (such as smart and debit cards).
57  India’s 
experience points to how the delivery of a major employment guarantee programme can  
help to ‘crowd-in’ or stimulate the development of IT infrastructure and a platform to deliver 
banking and other services to the area even as its primary aim is to make the programme 
delivery itself more effective.  Right from the beginning, NREGA implementation focused  
on the development of an information technology platform to ensure that information is 
provided, that programme management can be effectively monitored, and that timeliness  
can be ensured and corruption reduced in the payment cycle. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, 
for example, all stages of NREGA work—the registration of workers, the issuance of job cards, 
preparation of work estimates, muster rolls and payments to workers—have been 
computerised.
58 As a result, labour payments are made within a week of completion  
of the previous week's work,
59 a situation that contrasts sharply with that in other  
states and often in other countries as well.  24  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
Payments for NREGA workers are made through savings accounts in banks and post 
offices in an effort to cut out middlemen and reduce corruption.
60 For inaccessible and 
underserved areas, the use of mobile telephony and bank correspondents are being explored 
for delivery of banking services.
61  At the inception of the Jefes y Jefas programme in Argentina, 
the government issued personalized checks to pay workers, but this opened the door for 
several types of corruption. It then shifted to the use of a debit card that provided more 
transparency, with an individual bank account opened for each beneficiary. The information 
from the bank account also made it easier to analyse how funds were spent and facilitated 
benefits such as the reimbursement of VAT on the purchase of food or transportation.
62  
The potential of major public works programmes and social protection programmes  
to crowd-in the provision of other social protection measures, microcredit, insurance and 
business services in poor underserved areas is also attracting attention.
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5.7  QUALITY OF ASSETS AND SERVICES 
The question of assets produced by an employment guarantee is a key determinant  
of the guarantee’s impact, political acceptance and sustainability. The political reality is  
that the concept of providing an employment guarantee to everyone willing and able  
to work contradicts the conventional wisdom of development policy over the last thirty years. 
Therefore, policy makers and practitioners embarking on an EG programme should be well-
armed to face up to the strong political opposition that will inevitably arise. Ensuring that the 
infrastructure, assets, training and/or services produced under the programme are of good 
quality removes one potential criticism that would ineluctably lead to a weakening of the 
programme. If there is a coordinated framework for planning, accountability and participatory 
decision making for the projects that the EGS will support, then it will be easier to identify and 
address any problems involving deficient quality.
64 In addition, the design of the programme 
will in some instances also influence the longevity of the assets concerned. These issues are 
discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
5.7.1  Results Orientation to Meet Dual Objectives 
Experience has shown that many public employment programmes often find it difficult to 
balance maximising the creation of employment and the provision of assets or services.  
Lieuw-Kie-Song and Miller (2010, forthcoming) suggest that the reason for this is partially that 
the balance is tipped one way or the other, depending on the context in which the programme 
was designed and established.  In other words, a singular focus on achieving objectives 
through the creation of employment or on viewing work only as conditionality might  
result in poorly constructed assets and/or poor services (i.e., so-called ‘make-work’ 
programmes); similarly, a focus on assets and services is likely to result in the creation  
of less-than-optimal direct employment and to fail to reduce poverty as much as desired.  
This tension is also inevitable when programs are designed as a quick response to crisis.  
In cases where a PEP is designed as a crisis response or a counter-cyclical intervention with 
workers who are dropping in and out of the workforce, types of work should be chosen that  
do not require a permanent workforce. On the other hand, if there is an understanding that the 
programme will continue, works can consider synergies and foster ‘convergence’ with other 
programmes throughout an extended period.
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Separately, where payments are made on the basis of the amount of work done, perverse 
incentive structures need to be avoided, completion and maintenance of works need to be 
mandatory, and impact-monitoring needs to heed the difference made to livelihoods and 
development rather than simply the number of jobs created.
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5.7.2  Ensuring Productivity with Labour Intensity 
If an EG aims to create employment, then labour-intensive technologies and approaches 
should be used whenever possible. However, ‘whenever possible’ should mean ‘whenever 
they are technologically feasible, technically sound and cost-effective in terms of either 
straight financial or socio-economic costing’.
67 Many types of infrastructure
68 are not amenable 
to labour-intensive technologies and therefore should be avoided:  their inclusion in an EG or 
efforts to modify their employment content would result in poor quality assets and eventually 
lead to a backlash.  
An EGP should include small-scale types of infrastructure that have a high labour content. 
Almost invariably, these are also the kinds of infrastructure that are of most benefit to the 
poor.
69 This infrastructure can be categorized as infrastructure involving either technological 
options (i.e., labour-based, equipment-based or mixed) or, in some cases, solely labour-based 
technologies. Infrastructure of the first variety involves low-traffic feeder roads, water supply 
schemes, small earth dams, forestry activities, erosion control works, irrigation, and the like.  
Here it is possible to break down the various tasks involved and develop alternatives that 
involve different respective contributions of labour and equipment.
70 An example of the 
second variety can be taken from ILO-supported hill irrigation schemes in Nepal, where 
irrigation canals have to be built in steep and environmentally fragile terrain. Here the use of 
heavy equipment is not permissible, since it would cause landslides and create unwanted 
roads to use the equipment. Similarly, in slum upgrading schemes, narrow and winding streets 
and pathways are inaccessible to heavy equipment unless dwellings are destroyed.  In the case 
of NREGA, which focuses on maximising labour intensity (ratio of labour to materials is to be 
60:40), there are likely to be trade-offs in the quality and longevity of the resultant assets. 
However, a ‘convergence’ policy initiative (Government of India, Ministry of Rural 
Development, 2008) is seeking to extend the longevity of assets by bringing in technical and 
material resources from complementary sector programmes. Further, there needs to be a clear 
focus on ensuring financing and responsibility for the maintenance of assets. These are seldom 
built into the programme so as to have predictable results for the quality of the assets.
71 
At the same time, a focus on quality of assets and productivity should not exclude 
embracing new and innovative approaches. In many cases, work that is organised and 
managed in somewhat unconventional ways (such as through community fora or 
cooperatives) may be immediately dismissed as being ‘unproductive’, especially if is also 
involves activities that are socially useful but not ‘mainstream’, such as providing care to  
the vulnerable or patrolling dangerous areas in communities. Typically, extra efforts will be 
required to demonstrate that these somewhat unconventional approaches can work and are 
worth supporting in the long term. Related to this, the programmes will often be focused on 
producing goods and services that respond to the needs of the poor, including the direct 
beneficiaries themselves. Some of the services will not have a market price because  
they are traditionally not produced for sale, but involve exchange of services within  26  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
(often overburdened) social networks. They will need to be accounted in a different way  
than the use of traditional cost-benefit analysis. Including such social assets and services 
within an EG programme can extend the boundaries of public goods and services delivered 
through paid employment.  
5.7.3  Ensuring Adequate Technical Capacity and Training 
The choice of labour-based approaches based on careful study of the technological options is 
only the first step in ensuring high-quality assets. It is also essential to have specific training for 
workers, worksite supervisory personnel, private sector contractors and those responsible  
for controlling quality, verifying compliance with specifications, and making payments. 
Furthermore, where work is not done through force-account operations, procurement systems 
involving the whole gamut of actors, running from international development agencies to 
local government entities, must be adapted to the use of small-scale, labour-based contractors. 
There also needs to be an emphasis on accepted technical norms and standards for the asset 
or service, all backed up by easy-to-understand work manuals and capacity development, as 
well as an identification of options to organise work in order to increase the effective labour 
intensity without compromising productivity.  This is particularly important in countries where 
local government has weak capacity, but important responsibilities for implementation. 
Perhaps in the desire to maximise employment—and under political pressure to do so— 
 these programmes do not always budget sufficiently for the technical expertise needed  
at the field level.
72 An additional challenge consists in ensuring that the standards and level of 
infrastructure development and service provision are not undercut when work is performed in 
EG rather than under the auspices of the regular public sector—a danger that exists if there is 
an attempt to shift the latter types of activities onto public employment projects in times when 
funding is strained. 
5.7.4  Local Ownership, Monitoring and Accountability 
In general, assets from employment programmes are better implemented and maintained 
when local communities select the projects themselves in a participatory manner and when 
these projects lead to real economic returns for these communities and project workers.
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Planning, the raising of awareness, and monitoring procedures should consider the dual 
objectives of the programme and ensure adequate on-the-ground feedback about the quality 
and usefulness of the assets and services.  The use of information technologies and social 
audits can complement formal assessments, as in the case of NREGA in India.  
5.8  WAGE-SETTING 
Setting wages and benefits for an EGP is a complex task. On the one hand, it is argued that the 
wage should be set low enough to be ‘self-targeting’ to the intended beneficiaries, i.e., attract 
low- income populations who are not able to find alternative employment in the formal 
economy.  Care typically needs to be taken not to attract draw people out from alternative 
private or public sector employment opportunities.
74 Nevertheless, the beneficiaries could 
prefer such jobs to some types of existing work; this would be the case, for example, if such 
jobs reduced the need for ‘distress migration’ (although this might affect labour availability in 
the place of destination). By providing work opportunities that are physically closer to home, Working Paper  27 
 
the programme also potentially allows men and women to achieve a better work-life balance.
75 
There are also some trade-offs to consider (such as maximising the number of workers who  
can be employed versus significantly decreasing poverty, as well as complementarities  
(for example, the wage should be viewed as one component of total benefits and training 
basket). See Box 2 for a discussion of selected country experiences in setting wages. 
In countries where only a small portion of the economically active population works in the 
formal economy, it may be unrealistic immediately to enforce the minimum wage prevailing in 
the formal sector. At the same time, huge wage discrepancies between the planned EG wage 
and those prevalent in the same regions in smallholder agriculture or in the informal economy 
should be avoided in order to limit massive in-migration to programme areas and inflation.   
It could be argued that, as a benchmark, the EG wage could initially be slightly higher than  
that applied in rural agriculture or in the informal economy.
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However, a judicious setting of an EG wage and benefit package can be an important 
policy instrument for extending the effective application of a minimum wage throughout the 
entire economy or in a targeted local area, and for gradually eliminating or formalising  
the informal economy.
77  In India, NREGA implementation appears to have provided  
such a floor in many regions.  
Discussion is ongoing as to whether to have a uniform minimum wage for EG 
implementation.  A universal application of some sort of minimum wage is a realistic goal in 
cases where the gap between the customary wage in rural agriculture and in the informal 
economy, on the one hand, and in the formal sector in similar occupations, on the other  
hand, is not large.  As indicated earlier, in the context of a full-fledged ELR framework, the 
government would agree to buy all excess labour at a given ELR wage.  During periods of 
economic growth, the private sector will buy labour from this pool at a higher wage. However, 
in periods of downturn, the government will enforce the minimum wage through maintaining 
the buffer stock and therefore raising the wages currently earned by the working poor in the 
informal economy.  Ideally, the EG is expected to allow for full-time work (and part-time work, 
if desired), impose no time limits, and pay a uniform wage to all EGP workers (Wray, 2007, 
citing Minsky). If the wage paid in the EG programme became the effective minimum wage,  
all other employers would have to match it (with some exceptional cases in which workers 
would voluntarily accept a lower wage—perhaps in the arts). Similarly, the package of benefits 
offered would set a standard that other employers would normally match.
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Finally, other and different modalities of redistributing income within the context  
of an EG can be considered. For example, as has been done in the context of labour-intensive 
infrastructure development projects, introducing remuneration systems based on tasks or 
piece-work can motivate workers, increase productivity, and reduce the need for worker 
supervision. Workers who complete a designated task will receive the equivalent of a daily 
wage, but be able to go home and undertake other activities, for example, agricultural or 
domestic work. Piece-work is also a way for some workers to increase their income through 
several daily tasks. However, if the objective is to distribute a certain number of employment 
opportunities widely, then it is best not to allow workers to cumulate several daily tasks and to 
ensure that workers can actually earn at least the minimum wage under assumed rates and 
productivity norms. Community contracts offer another way to pay workers.  
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BOX 2 
Selected Country Experiences in Wage Setting 
In the initial phase of South Africa’s EPWP,79 wages and conditions of work were allowed to be set  
locally by implementing public bodies (municipalities and provinces) under a special dispensation.80  
Criticism of this process alleged that the programme was fuelling a trend toward the ‘informalisation’ of 
employment and backsliding on acquired workers’ rights.81  For the second phase of the EPWP (which began 
in April 2009), the proposal being considered identifies different factors to consider when determining the 
wage rate: (i) Poverty line: someone working full-time should earn enough to get above the poverty line 
(which is a bit complicated as there is no consensus about where the poverty line should be drawn);  
(ii) Social grants: the wage should not be below the level of the disability grant in SA, the purpose of which is 
to provide income to those who cannot work; (iii) Minimum wage regulations: wage rates should not exceed 
existing regulated minimum wage levels (this was also problematic, as some regulated minimum wage levels 
do not meet the two requirements above); (iv) Labour markets prevailing wage rates: these should be taken 
into consideration for a variety of reasons, including the ability to assess the impact of the ELR wage rate;  
(v) Reservation wages: there is also the question of what the distribution of the reservation wages is, as this 
will help in targeting and predicting uptake; (vi) Fiscal constraints: if there are fiscal constraints and higher 
rates would cause fewer people to be employed, there needs to be a decision between employing more 
people at lower wages or fewer at higher wages. In the end, the recommendation is that a national minimum 
wage rate be set that is pegged to the disability grant and is 130 per cent of the equivalent daily rate.  
This is still a recommendation and needs to go through the required consultation and approval process. 
In the case of Argentina’s Jefes, the wage was set at three quarters of hourly minimum wage.  
Many argued that the minimum was very low and not sufficient to cover a minimum basket of goods and 
services, that it should be at least at the poverty line and that it should be combined with a child allowance 
for large households and pensions for those too old to work. In the context of the NREGA in India, workers are 
entitled to the statutory minimum wage applicable to agricultural labourers in the state, unless and until the 
central government ‘notifies’ a different wage rate. 
 
Although there are different models of community contracting, the principle one permits 
the community to receive wage payments collectively and then to redistribute them to 
community workers according to wage rates and incentive structures that the community 
itself decides through a participatory process. These infrastructure projects also benefit the 
community and therefore provide an additional incentive for participation.   In conclusion,  
the level and mode of remuneration are important to the success of an EG. Well-designed 
remuneration and social protection systems support the value of employment as a human 
right (i.e., poverty reduction, dignity and social justice), the macro-economic goals of 
stimulating consumption, improving the income redistribution and economic growth,  
and the operational goals of transparency, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the 
management and governance of an EG. 
5.9  WORKING FOR GENDER EQUITY 
While some public works programmes have explicitly included targets for women, a large 
number and, in some instances, the majority, of beneficiaries or participants in many other 
programmes have been women even though they were not explicitly targeted.82 Reasons for 
strong participation by women include: family income optimisation strategies (given the low Working Paper  29 
 
wages offered by such programmes, men have often preferred to work elsewhere or to 
migrate for better paying work while opting for women to complement such earnings  
through participation in public works programmes); the preference of women for public  
works activities compared to other activities available to them; payment of equal wages  
(e.g., by NREGA) or higher than otherwise available to them; and the potential to more easily 
combine work with child and other care responsibilities where facilities are either offered at 
work sites or where such services can be included as paid employment opportunities by the 
public works programme.83  More specifically, the following issues need to be considered to 
ensure more equitable participation and gender-equitable outcomes: 
  Gender-Aware Areas of Focus: Implementation agencies need to be sensitive to 
gender-differentiated, class and/or social group priorities for projects and activities 
to be included in the programme—and to ensure participation by poor women in 
particular in consultations and decision-making processes.
84  Antonopoulos et al.85 
point out that filling ‘hidden vacancies’ (i.e., care work currently being undertaken 
largely by women as unpaid labour) can extend the boundaries of paid female 
employment and has many advantages, including: the promotion of improved 
equity in labour markets; the creation of new and improved employment 
opportunities, rather than the downgrading of existing employment positions; 
extension of the boundaries of publicly-provided social services as the 
responsibility of the public sector; and the establishment of a potential community 
interface with more formal delivery mechanisms to improve health and education 
outcomes, and the like.86 
  Conditions to ensure equitable participation: The provision of child care and other 
facilities at work sites (e.g., as required by NREGS projects) is critical to reducing 
unpaid care work and the time burden faced by women and allowing for more 
equitable participation. EG programmes themselves can focus on these services 
(e.g., Jefes y Jefas and EPWP). 
  Equitable Wages and Equal Pay for Comparable Work:
87 Any existing gender-based 
inequities in wages must be addressed. Work can be organised so that women 
workers receive equal pay for comparable work and the required minimum wage 
as a result of equal time at work.
88 Productivity norms must also be gender- and 
age-sensitive.  Because power relations within households are often unequal and 
single women and widows usually suffer from greater poverty, some people argue 
that the EGP should ensure that, where possible, assignment of work and payment 
of wages be made to the individual for his/her particular contribution. 
  Technical Training: The provision of technical training has been highlighted  
in EGP activities to enable women in particular to improve their livelihoods and to 
enable them to participate in more highly skilled, less traditional occupations in 
EGP contexts.
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  Addressing health issues, particularly with regard to infrastructure projects:  
In countries where women suffer disproportionately from malnutrition, ensuring 
equitable participation in public works that focus on infrastructure projects would 
also require coordination between the government implementing authority and 
the local health services. (Mehrotra, 2008b). 30  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
  Ensuring that EGPs/PEPs do not contribute adversely to the time burden faced by 
women in particular: In some instances, this may mean that all work is designed for 
a half day to allow more time for other productive activities that may contribute to 
the household’s livelihood or assist the performance of domestic responsibilities.
90 
5.10  FOCUS AREAS FOR EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAMMES 
An EGP can encompass a wide variety of work, ranging from natural resource management 
and physical infrastructure investments and maintenance to basic social services.  
Because given countries have adopted different starting points and approaches,  
the areas of focus have also varied.  
While an EG approach is often expected to extend the boundaries of the public sector,  
it is important to ensure that this actually happens. The EGPs should, in principle, undertake 
new tasks or projects, rather than divert a cheap and temporary labour supply into existing, 
under-funded government programmes.  This poses challenges, though:  in a crisis, how it is  
possible to provide services that might otherwise be cut while not inadvertently aiding 
‘informalisation’?
91 And in areas not receiving any services at all, how can ELR programmes 
help to provide these services?  
PEPs are generally funded by the national government, but the work activities will 
generally fall within the mandates of state or local governments; in many developing 
countries, service gaps will typically exist, because local governments are not able to fund 
these services themselves.  In most fiscal relations between various levels of government, 
though, national governments usually avoid subsidising municipal services, as subsidies would 
weaken precisely the local revenue collection functions that they wish to strengthen. Samson, 
for instance, argues that EPWP waste collection programmes should not be initiated in areas 
not already served and that only an expansion of existing normal municipal waste collection 
services is acceptable.  Yet this view overlooks the fact that there are no waste collection 
services in these poor areas primarily because these local governments cannot afford to 
subsidise these services in the first place.  The EPWP proposal therefore displaces only 
hypothetical jobs, which would be created only if the local government could afford them;  
the proposal does not displace actual jobs.  Samson would presumably argue that the funds 
for the EPWP should rather be used to hire new municipal workers to provide these waste 
collection services. Yet this would mean that the EPWP funds would be operational subsidies 
to fund local government salaries, which would require a different funding approach and 
mechanism and, indeed, a different legal basis. 
This clearly illustrates that it is difficult to determine which activities should be part of an 
EGP in countries where there are serious deficits in the provision of services.  In the short term, 
it may make sense to use an EGP approach to address these deficits, as the EG provides a new 
funding source to provide the service. In the long term, however, there should be a strategy to 
ensure that the workers who provide these services are not stuck in EGP jobs permanently 
simply because this is a cheaper option for (local) government. These decisions require 
flexibility and deliberate consultation, but also—and more important—regular reviews.  
In waste collection example from South Africa, it would be possible to initiate EPWP waste 
collection programmes only in areas where there are currently no services, but also with  
the understanding that this is a temporary solution and that this decision would need to be Working Paper  31 
 
reviewed periodically.  The programme could then provide the much-needed service and 
income. In the meantime, measures could be put in place to strengthen the finances of the 
respective municipalities so that they would be able to provide these services within a specific 
time. This flexibility is important to get programmes to scale, as the more one restricts work 
categories for PEP/EGP, the harder it becomes to employ many people productively. The ability 
to manage this flexibility requires specific institutional arrangements that would be tasked 
with reviewing the specific work categories periodically.  
In the NREGA, the work activities have been clearly specified in the Act
92 and the  
central government may change these work activities in consultation with respective state 
governments. Presumably, the Central Employment Guarantee Council and respective  
State Guarantee Councils would advise their respective governments about these changes.  
Given the complexity of these decisions, however, the involvement of different stakeholders 
might be required to ensure broad support and effective implementation. 
In conclusion there will be a trade-off in many countries between, on the one hand, 
including a broader set of activities to allow for large-scale programmes and, on the other hand, 
focusing on a smaller set of tightly defined activities that would potentially limit the amount of 
employment that can be offered and the number of public bodies and organisations that could 
contribute to and take ownership over these employment creation efforts. 
5.10.1  Physical Infrastructure 
First and foremost, employment creation should always be an explicit goal of infrastructure 
development, undertaken within an employment guarantee programme and ensuring that 
the infrastructure or services are of good technical quality or high standards. Depending upon 
the design and local circumstances, contracting and partnering with the private sector and 
civil society can aid in addressing technical gaps at local levels. 
A further issue is the extent to which infrastructure development should explicitly support 
private sector development. When fostering recovery of the private sector after a crisis, there 
should also be a focus on stimulating the development of the private sector by investing in 
public infrastructure, particularly in the context of identifying synergies with local economic 
development strategies. Separately, an issue raised in India in the context of NREGA relates to 
investment in assets on private land, which NREGA only permits on private land belonging  
to SC/STs, the poor, and marginal farmers. The issue has been whether to exhaust addressing  
of public good deficits first before any work on private lands or to do both concurrently.  
The response has depended in part on the context and on the potential to increase 
productivity on lands in question. It remains a subject of considerable debate, although some 
of the pilots appear promising so far. There needs to be more exploration of issues related to 
complementary programmes here.
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5.10.2  Natural Resource Management and Protection  
The NREGA in India, the EPWP in South Africa, and the PSNP in Ethiopia all have strong 
components for the management of natural resources with a view to either complementing 
the focus of rural development strategies (e.g. increasing agricultural productivity and 
livelihood creation in India) or addressing various environmental and MDG-related deficits 32  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
(e.g., food security). Further, in Argentina’s Jefes, 87 per cent of the beneficiaries worked in 
community projects that included agricultural micro-enterprises, cleaning and environmental 
support in the agricultural sector, improving sewer systems and water drainage (Tcherneva 
and Wray 2005a). The PSNP in Ethiopia focuses on the management of natural resources, and 
especially on watershed rehabilitation and conservation and initiatives to prevent soil erosion. 
In the context of environmental conservation, climate change concerns and a focus on 
‘greening the economy’, job creation is at the crux of the environment and poverty reduction.
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5.10.3  Social Services  
In developing countries, deficits in public service delivery are typically compensated for by 
increased unpaid work performed mostly by women and children as well as kin networks, 
particularly in the case of poor households.  These deficits and the resulting increases in the 
time burden for women are even worse during crises, as services are reduced.  Hence, an ELR 
focus on public and social service delivery could improve the wellbeing of women in particular.   
Various social and community services are important components of South Africa’s EPWP 
and Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas programmes. Tcherneva and Wray (2005) describe the activities 
supported by the Jefes y Jefas programme; much of the community work, for example, was 
performed in local community centres that were either renovated or newly constructed. 
Examples of community services performed in these centres included food kitchens or centres 
that addressed domestic violence or provided temporary shelter and other services to abused 
women or children. Other projects included health promotion programmes, which offered 
basic education in sanitation and hygiene. Others dealt with mending old clothes donated to 
poor communities or repairing and cataloguing scrapped books for public libraries in poorer 
communities.   The social development pillar of the first phase of South Africa’s EPWP focused 
on Home Community Based Care (HCBC) and Early Childhood Development (ECD). In its 
second phase, which began in April 2009, the EPWP is expected to expand ECD and HCBC 
services, move into other activities (such as school nutrition, voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT), school caretakers, and the like), and employ and assist low-income women in tasks that 
they are currently doing as unpaid work.
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While these may be critical to women, widening the EG focus should not be viewed 
merely as a substitute for expanding public service delivery. Furthermore, care should be  
taken not to erode standards in health, education or other social services by allowing a poorly 
prepared or trained EG programme workforce to deliver those services. One way to ensure that 
the EG does not fuel ‘casualisation’ and ‘informality’ in the labour market would be to allocate 
PEP wage resources to those same technical departments that are responsible for delivering 
these same services through the regularly established workforce (e.g., trained and unionised 
teachers, health workers, etc.), to set clear boundaries and guidelines for PEP workers and for 
the regularly established workforce, and to identify how some portion of PEP work might be 
‘regularised’ as economic conditions improve. 
5.10.4  Potential and Emerging Areas of Focus 
Some potential emerging areas of focus for EGP and new approaches could be adopted with 
regard to (i) infrastructure development to include ‘new infrastructure’ critical to stimulating 
investment in under-served areas (e.g., laying broadband fibre at the same time that roads are 
being constructed) or the provision of energy services and responding to climate change Working Paper  33 
 
(Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2009, Winkler, 2009) and (ii) service delivery that shows a greater awareness 
of gender equity (see EPWP Phase 2).  An innovative proposal in the second phase of South 
Africa’s EPWP is to broaden the institutional framework of the programme and thereby  
the range of activities that could be covered. What is being proposed and tested is that the  
EPWP wage incentive be made available to non-state organisations that are also non-profit 
organisations (see Box 1).  These organisations would be able to create employment and fund 
the wage costs of this employment through the wage incentive. This would not only broaden 
the range of activities, as these organizations would be given the much more freedom to 
identify activities, but also mobilize the capacity of civil society to create and manage work.
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Trinidad and Tobago’s Unemployment Relief Programme contains similar provisions.
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5.10.5  Linkages with the MDGs   
Suitably designed EG programmes can contribute to the MDGs in a variety of ways ranging 
from the provision of employment per se to addressing MDG-related infrastructure and service 
delivery deficits.  Lieuw-Kie-Song and Miller (forthcoming) point out that, aside from the direct 
benefits of gainful employment and poverty reduction, access to work by the poor also 
contributes indirectly to achieving the other MDGs. If access to education is affordable, the 
poor are more likely to keep their children in school if they are employed and can see the 
benefits. At a macro level, job creation and formalization help increase tax revenues and  
the financing and sustainability of MDG-related service delivery and social protection.
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5.10.6  Training and Capacity Development  
Training and capacity development are an important focus area for EG programmes.  
While employment guarantee programmes, as argued by Minsky, should take workers  
as they are and training should not be a basis for pre-qualification, all EGP workers should 
receive training in the technical area in which they are employed
99 and in other areas if 
needed, as a combination of basic skills provided by formal education and ‘on the job’  
training is the best investment in human capital. Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas supported  
both the completion of formal education (literacy was rated just like a work commitment) 
and various general and job-specific training (e.g., computer literacy, construction, green 
jobs, child and elderly care, and health and educational support to foster both individual  
and group capabilities).  With regard to NREGA implementation in India, there needs to be a 
much greater focus on skills development and opportunities for unemployed youth and 
women.
100 A common weakness of many programmes has been that training is treated as an 
add-on and a type of fringe benefit, rather than as a means to improve the productivity and 
quality of ELR employment and the capacities of ELR beneficiaries to transition to better 
opportunities in the public and private sectors. 
6  CONCLUSION 
The effective functioning of the labour market is a central factor dynamically linking the 
economy to the well-being of individuals and households in modern societies. In many 
instances, though, labour markets do not work for the poor even in normal situations. Thus, 
there has been a growing call for the state to take on a role of Employer of Last Resort (ELR) to 
serve as a ‘buffer’ by providing a range of useful jobs that individuals could fill during periods 
of high unemployment and vacate when labour market opportunities improved. 34  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
The paper has attempted to link 1) some of the theoretical arguments advanced by 
economists in favour of an EG and the experience with implementing PEP and large Public 
Works programmes with 2) the practical and political-economic issues that government policy 
makers, project managers and technical staff will have to face in designing and implementing 
a sustainable programme. To date, the strongest advocates for an EG have tended to be 
economists who are grounded largely in post-Keynesian and functional finance economics and 
whose experience and focus have largely been on industrialised countries.  Yet the logic of EG 
is even stronger in low-income ‘labour surplus’ developing countries with shortages of goods 
and services that the poor themselves can contribute to providing.  Employment programmes, 
such as India’s NREGA, Argentina’s Jefes y Jefas, and South Africa’s EPWP, combine 
characteristics of industrialized and developing countries and therefore help to broaden the 
terms of the debate. This paper draws on these types of experiences to explore the scope, 
relevance and applicability of EG policies to other developing countries, some of which have 
already acquired experience from implementing various public works programmes of  
their own, albeit stand-alone and on a limited scale. Indeed, such employment-intensive 
infrastructure and investment programmes provide a much-needed stepping stone for 
establishing a broader employment guarantee. Many of the lessons learned from labour-
intensive public works programmes, be they technical, financial, economic or institutional,  
can be applied when establishing an employment guarantee. 
The paper explored how an EG approach could be a justified and useful policy tool, in 
combination with social protection and a forward-looking approach to employment, to make 
labour markets function more effectively for the poor, to stimulate employment-rich economic 
growth, and to facilitate the private sector’s role in job creation. In order for a PEP to evolve 
into a more universally accessible employment guarantee, it should offer adequate 
employment opportunities that affect various dimensions of the labour market, including 
ensuring that there is a ‘floor’ in the wage rates of unskilled and informal workers in order help 
stabilise wages and the demand for labour, particularly in rural economies.  While cash grants 
are often stressed as an alternative to public employment programmes, this paper argued that 
PEPs can be complementary to other types of social protection and assistance programmes 
that seek to smooth consumption, foster investment in human capital, and help to mitigate 
inequality and vulnerability. Because significant service delivery and infrastructure deficits 
often coexist with labour market concerns, there seems to be a need to focus on public 
employment programmes that facilitate a move toward more decent work and can help  
to link these various elements.  
While broadly supportive of the EG approach, the paper also calls attention to potential 
drawbacks and contradictions that practitioners may face. For example, if the EG programme  
is meant to expand the boundaries of accepted public sector employment and services, how  
can undercutting acquired labour rights in the public sector be avoided? How can temporary 
short-term labour be used while maintaining a trained and organized labour force? Are a short-
term focus and time limits on participants’ participation valid amid continued, high levels of 
structural unemployment? Since many PEP-type programmes have been initiated in response 
to a financial crisis or natural disaster, how can these ‘windows of opportunity’ be best 
exploited to establish an EG policy and programme as a sustainable feature of economic and 
social policy? The focus has also been on how to best design an EG and to increase national 
capacities to ensure sustainability and political support. The intention is not only to combat 
rising unemployment during crisis, but also to contribute to decent work and to do this in 
relation to high-quality assets and public services.  Working Paper  35 
 










































































































































































social equity.  For ADB (2008), social protection  comprises five major  kinds  of 
activities:  labour  market policies and  programs,  social  insurance,  social 
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ANNEX 2: CHECKLIST FOR THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF AN EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAMME 
1.  Linking an EG Programme to International and National Mandates  
on Employment Creation 
a.  Has the government ratified or supported the following international instruments on 
employment creation? 
i.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): ‘the right to work’. 
ii.  International Labour Organization Employment Policy Convention (1964), 
No. 122: ‘promotion of full, productive and freely chosen employment’. 
iii.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). 
iv.  World Summit on Social Development (1995): poverty reduction, 
employment creation and social inclusion. 
v.  Millennium Summit (2000): youth employment. 
vi.  World Summit (2005): make the goals of full and productive employment 
and decent work for all a central objective of national and international 
policies and national development strategies, including for poverty 
reduction. 
vii.  Role of employment in the national poverty reduction strategy (PRS)  
and in the Highly-Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief process. 
viii.  Linkages to national constitution provisions relating to right to work or 
right to an adequate livelihood. 
ix.  Right to information provisions. 
 
2.  Designing an EG as a Response to the Current Economic,  
Social and Employment Situation 
a.  Diagnostic of and indicators on: 
i.  Type of unemployment. Structural, frictional, seasonal; employment 
relative to indicators of productive capacity in the economy. 
ii.  Demand or capital constraints. 
iii.  Levels of employment, unemployment and under employment  
(including long-term). 
iv.  Numbers of the ‘working poor’ (age and gender distribution). 
v.  Importance and growth of informal economy (non declared workers  
and self employed). 
vi.  Employment content of economic growth: employment and output 
elasticities (by sector). 
vii.  Productive sectors that lead economic growth and those that lead 
employment and mechanisms to build linkages across them. 40  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
3.  Costing and Financing an EG 
a.  Does the government have a sovereign currency (floating exchange rate)? 
b.  Does the government have fiscal sovereignty, that is, the ability to decide on its own 
budgetary allocations without constraints relating to external debt or to 
conditionalities imposed by international monetary, financial and development 
institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank, regional development banks, etc.)? 
c.  Is employment creation a fundamental element of the government’s poverty reduction 
and/or development strategy? 
d.  Undertake a comparative analysis of budgetary allocations for various departments of 
government and as a percentage of GDP within different economic sectors and identify 
the opportunities for scaling up employment therein. 
e.  Undertake an employment impact analysis of the government’s public investment 
programme and identify the opportunities for increasing its impact on job creation. 
f.  Estimate the economic, financial and social costs of unemployment. 
g.  Undertake a projection of the costs of putting in place a universal  
employment guarantee. 
h.  Build in the costs of ensuring adequate provision of facilities to ensure equitable 
participation of women. 
i.  Provide budgetary incentives to the different technical departments (e.g., public works, 
environment, health, education, water resources, urban development, etc.), including 
,but going beyond, the allocations provided to the ministry of labour/employment, 
with respect to their projected contributions to job creation. 
j.  Negotiate with ministry of finance, parliament, potential donors and international 
financial institutions the required budgetary allocations for putting in place an EG. 
k.  Estimate indirect job creation and impacts and multiplier. 
 
4.  Targeting and Impact Analysis 
a.  Time period and entitlement: where possible, the entitlement should be open-ended, 
although, in practice, there may be both seasonal and limitations in time for beneficiaries. 
b.  Set wage rates and remuneration at a level that ensures that the programme is self-
targeting, i.e., that it does not draw labour away from alternative employment 
opportunities in the formal economy that pay a decent wage (see wage setting below), 
but that also has an impact on poverty levels. 
c.  Identify poorest regions in which to initiate an EGP until required capacity is developed, 
experience gained and political support acquired as a condition for extending the 
programme nationwide. 
d.  If rural-urban migration is an issue, begin the programme in rural rather than urban areas. 
e.  Monitor the impacts of EG wages on wage-rates, on employment in agriculture and on 
the informal economy including on a gender-disaggregated basis. 
f.  Based on costing projections and available resources, consider rationing EG 
employment opportunities to male and female heads of households (consider how to 
address the needs of single individuals, particularly poor and single women), to part-
time rather than full-time employment or to a limited number of annual workdays. 
g.  Ensure that women are given equal access and opportunity under an EGP. 
h.  Take specific measures to encourage and promote youth employment. Working Paper  41 
 
5.  Wage setting 
a.  For rural-based programmes, schedule work and set wages so as not to draw labour 
from nor interfere with agricultural production but set with regard to the poverty line 
so that ELR work is poverty reducing. Also identify other needed allowances  
(e.g., for children or elderly to compensate households) to complement wages. 
b.  For least developed countries where most of the economically active population is in 
the informal economy, set wages close to or slightly higher than the wage prevailing in 
the informal economy on the condition it meets the poverty line. 
c.  For transitional or industrialised economies where informal employment is a relatively 
small percentage of total employment (less than half) set wages at the level of the 
official minimum wage in effect in the sector or region where the EG programme is 
being implemented. 
d.  For ELR employment in public works and infrastructure development, use piece— 
or task work remuneration systems to ensure worker productivity and good quality 
asset creation. 
e.  Ensure that wages and benefits paid to EGP labour are clearly demarcated from wages 
paid to the established work force in order to avoid an EG programme leading to the 
informalisation of employment in a given sector or area of public service. 
f.  Ensure timely and public payment of wages and transparency in all aspects of 
remuneration allocations and payments (linked to need for management information 
systems to ensure effective management and accountability and payment systems). 
g.  Set up local oversight bodies for remuneration setting and payments composed of 
community, worker and employer representatives. 
 
6.  Categories of Employment 
a.  Infrastructure and asset creation 
i.  Technology choice in infrastructure investments. 
ii.  Undertake employment impact assessment of infrastructure investments. 
iii.  Kind of infrastructure.
101 
1.  Productive infrastructure 
a.  Agricultural and agri-business improvements 
i.  Improvement to rain-fed agriculture. 
ii.  Erosion control in fields. 
iii.  Irrigation works. 
iv.  Cereal banks, warehouse and cold storage facilities. 
v.  Marketing facilities. 
b.  Environmental improvements 
i.  Watershed management. 
ii.  Erosion control. 
iii.  Afforestation. 
iv.  Gully correction. 
v.  Flood control. 42  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
c.  Water supply, conservation and sanitation 
i.  Small earth dams. 
ii.  Piped water lines, particularly in underserved areas 
and reservoirs. 
iii.  Wells. 
iv.  Drainage. 
v.  Water retention basins.   
vi.  Construction of separate latrines for men and 
women (including at schools), infrastructure for 
public sanitation and disposal of solid and liquid 
waste, etc.  
vii.  Removal of invasive species and conservation 
measures. 
d.  Transportation infrastructure and maintenance 
i.  To rural and urban markets. 
ii.  Street paving.  
iii.  Agricultural feeder roads: construction, 
rehabilitation, spot improvements and 
maintenance. 
iv.  Road maintenance. 
v.  Laying of fibre and/or other communications 
infrastructure at the time that roads and waterways 
are constructed. 
e.    Commons Infrastructure 
i.  Improvement of grazing lands. 
ii.  Plantation of fodder. 
iii.  Fuel wood. 
2.  Social and Related Pro-Poor Infrastructure 
a.  Health centres. 
b.  Schools, and related infrastructure (latrines, facilities for 
mid-day meals, library and after school study spaces). 
c.  Community centres. 
d.  Child care centres. 
e.  Park and public space improvements. 
f.  Training centres. 
b.  Social Services 
i.  Types of activities
102 
1.  Companion for senior citizens, the bed-ridden, mentally or 
physically disabled.  Working Paper  43 
 
2.  HIV/AIDS and chronic illness related care; community-based  
health workers. 
3.  Public school classroom assistant; mid-day meal assistant. 
4.  Safety monitor for schools, parks, neighbourhoods, playgrounds, 
subway stations, street intersections, or shopping centres.  
5.  Neighbourhood cleanup/highway cleanup.  
6.  Low income housing restoration. 
7.  Day care assistants for children of EG workers. 
8.  Library assistants. 
9.  Environmental safety monitors.  
10. Local and traditional artists and musicians. 
11. Community or cultural historian. 
 
7.  Programme management 
a.  Have clear guidelines been issued and disseminated regarding the following? 
i.  Qualification/hiring criteria. 
ii.  Wage rates and remuneration package. 
iii.  Length and duration of employment opportunities. 
b.  Has management been delegated to decentralized government institutions 
appropriate to delivery? 
c.  What steps have been taken to ensure job creation objectives do not detract from 
good quality technical assets and services? 
d.  Have steps been taken to set up good management information systems to ensure 
good project management and accountability? 
 
8.  Institutional arrangements 
a.  What steps have been taken to ensure full ownership of the EGP by technical 
departments concerned with the assets and services provided by the programme? 
b.  What institutional arrangements have been put in place to ensure coordination of 
concerned technical departments, particularly in the case of area-based development 
programmes involving interventions in different sectors or fields? 
c.  What mechanisms have been put in place to avoid conflicts between the established 
workforce and the EG within a given technical field? 
d.  Have EG oversight mechanisms been put in place? Have mechanisms for social audits 
been mandated and put in place? 
e.  Which institutions are responsible and what ongoing budgetary allocations have been 
put in place for operation and maintenance of assets created under the programme? 
  44  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
9.  Beneficiary/worker participation and responsiveness 
a.  What mechanisms have been put in place to consult with EGP labour regarding 
conditions of work? 
b.  What mechanisms have been put in place to consult with beneficiaries regarding 
priority focus areas, projects selected and assets created? How are gender differences 
in priorities to be adjudicated? 
c.  Has community contracting of small-scale infrastructure and maintenance 
interventions been considered?  
d.  Is there a right to information that also applies to public spending programmes? 
 
10. Training 
a.  Is orientation organized for all new EGP recruits? 
b.  How are training activities chosen and designed?  
c.  Are there specific training programmes aimed at empowering poor women to take 
semi-skilled and skilled categories of work and improve livelihood opportunities? 
d.  Is training designed so as to facilitate the upward mobility of labour? 
e.  Is training given within the technical fields of EGP interventions with a  
view to enhancing productivity and quality of assets and services? 
f.  Does training involve practical on-the-job training as well as classroom training? 
g.  Do participants receive certification of training received? 
h.  Is there a tracking system to judge effectiveness of training?  Working Paper  45 
 
ANNEX 3:  FULL EMPLOYMENT AND THE RIGHT TO WORK  
A number of global commitments on human rights provide a mandate for a focus on the right 
to work.
103  In particular, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in its article 23, 
spells out employment and the right to work as a human right: 
  Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.  
  Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.  
  Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration  
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity,  
and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.  
  Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection  
of his interests.  
 
The International Labour Organization, in the 1964 Employment Policy Convention  
(no. 122), commits to full, productive and freely chosen employment as a central feature to 
economic and social policy: 
1.  With a view to stimulating economic growth and development, raising levels  
of living, meeting manpower requirements and overcoming unemployment and 
underemployment, each Member shall declare and pursue, as a major goal, an active 
policy designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment.  
2.  The said policy shall aim at ensuring that: 
i.  there is work for all who are available for and seeking work;  
ii.  such work is as productive as possible;  
iii.  there is freedom of choice of employment and the fullest possible opportunity for 
each worker to qualify for, and to use his skills and endowments in, a job for which 
he is well suited, irrespective of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin.  
3.  The said policy shall take due account of the stage and level of economic development 
and the mutual relationships between employment objectives and other economic 
and social objectives, and shall be pursued by methods that are appropriate to national 
conditions and practices.  
 
However, it was not until the 1995 World Summit for Social Development that the three 
goals of poverty reduction, employment creation and social inclusion were explicitly linked as 
specific objectives of broader development policies.  Nevertheless, employment as a specific 
objective was largely missing from the first generation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs)—the critical policy vehicle for securing resources and identifying priorities for poverty 
reduction in many Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and heavily indebted countries.
104  
During the 2000 World Summit that adopted the Millennium Development Goals,  
employment creation, except for a target on youth employment, was also absent.   
However, at the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations General Assembly, heads  46  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
of state and government of more than 150 countries made a commitment to implement  
a wide-ranging international agenda requiring global, regional and national action.  
They declared:   
“We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and productive 
employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a central objective of 
our relevant national and international policies as well as our national development strategies, 
including poverty reduction strategies, as part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals.”
105 [Paragraph 47 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document]. 
 
This commitment was reaffirmed in July 2006 at the high-level segment of the substantive 
session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council on the theme ‘Creating an 
environment at the national and international levels conducive to generating full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, and its impact on sustainable development.’    
Further, in order to assist the member agencies of the United Nations System Chief 
Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) in this endeavour, the High Level Committee on 
Programmes (HLCP) of the CEB also asked the ILO to take the lead, in collaboration with 
interested agencies, to develop a Toolkit for Mainstreaming Employment and Decent Work.106  
Further, the most recent CEB communiqué announced in the context of the economic crisis 
agreed on nine joint initiatives, including a ‘Global Jobs Pact’ and the need for a ‘Social 
Protection Floor.’ As part of the UN system, UNDP has also focused, in cooperation with the 
ILO, on assisting countries in enhancing job opportunities in the context of its work on  
poverty reduction and development.107  
This growing awareness of the importance of employment as reflected in global 
mandates and national policy frameworks is also driven by the realization that, with current 
policies, neither the quantity nor the quality of employment is growing fast enough to sustain 
poverty reduction and inclusive development.  Working Paper  47 
 
ANNEX 4: EMPLOYMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (ILO PRACTICE) 
Employment-impact studies undertaken by the ILO’s Employment-Intensive Investment 
Programme can be categorized into three broad categories. A number of studies do not fit 
neatly into one category, or rather combine elements from the different categories. 
The first category examines micro-level project data to compare labour-based and 
equipment- based methods for infrastructure construction. So far, such studies have focused 
largely on road construction projects where the technical standards of the completed 
infrastructure are generally comparable. Although the results vary depending on the type of 
terrain, the cost structure of the economy, overall it can be said that such studies demonstrate 
that good quality labour-based road construction can be carried out at the same quality, and 
often cost 30-40 per cent less than equipment-based methods, while at the same time creating 
two to four times more employment. The field data obtained from such studies is also used to 
input into simulation models (see the third category below) that provide a comparative 
analysis of the macro-economic impacts of different technical alternatives for infrastructure 
construction, usually classified and (over-) simplified into three alternatives: labour-based, 
equipment-based and mixed. Therefore this category of study therefore is both useful in and 
of itself as an analytical tool and a basis for advocacy and promotion of labour-intensive 
approaches. Obviously, this comparison applies only in situations where labour-based 
technologies provide a real alternative to equipment-based approaches. What is meant by  
‘real alternative’ to equipment-based technologies usually includes the following parameters: 
  Labour-based methods can provide infrastructure of comparative quality  
and technical standards 
  Labour-based infrastructure can be delivered within a comparative timeframe 
  Labour-based methods can be delivered within the same financial budget 
 
The ILO’s Employment-Intensive Investment Programme focuses its efforts on promoting 
labour-based or mixed alternatives in cases where all three of the above conditions are 
satisfied. However, such studies can also be useful in identifying and quantifying trade-offs 
between alternative technologies so that policy makers can take informed decisions. Questions 
that such methodologies may help to address include the following: In cases where labour-
based methods cost more in financial terms than equipment-based methods, how do their 
socio-economic costs compare once shadow pricing is applied? Also, in view of priority being 
given to employment creation in a given situation, what is the premium in terms of higher cost 
and delivery time that policy makers may wish to assign to labour-based technologies?  
How can such studies be used to integrate employment-concerns into investment decisions?  
The methodological questions that arise in undertaking such studies are rather 
straightforward. Such studies depend on reliable worksite data. Typically, more detailed and 
reliable data is available for labour-based projects, since the projects studied have often been 
carried out with ILO technical assistance that has been instrumental in collecting the required 
data. Equipment-based worksites are usually carried out by large and often foreign enterprises 
that may be unwilling to share real costs and worksite reporting and payroll forms and 48  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
information. Furthermore, as labour-based worksites are usually undertaken through  
small-scale labour-based contractors (as opposed to ‘force account’ labour), the question 
of access to data on actual labour costs and attendance is an issue not only for equipment-
based methods. Likewise, equipment costs are also difficult to adequately assess since 
equipment may be acquired with a certain subsidy element (waiving of import duties, 
official development aid, etc.). 
In some cases, data collection systems are set in place during project design to ensure that 
required data is available as part of normal monitoring and evaluation procedures. However,  
if such analysis is to become a routine element of infrastructure project development, then  
the methodologies should be compatible with the reality of worksite management. Since 
contractors (labour-based or equipment-based) tender and are paid on the basis of delivered 
product rather than on the basis of required labour or equipment inputs, then contractors 
typically do not collect and report on labour inputs in relation to output. Therefore, such 
studies depend on putting in place special data collection arrangements or, alternatively,  
can be carried out on the basis of sample worksites that are visited and analysed as work is 
underway, or are evaluated after the fact through interviews with worksite supervisory 
personnel and consultation of site records. 
A second category of studies analyses the employment impact of infrastructure 
components of certain sectors of a government’s public investment programme or budget.  
The objective behind such studies, in addition to providing an overview of the current 
employment yield of a country’s investment programme, is to identify lost opportunities for 
employment creation. Such studies can be used to set in motion a process of reallocation of 
public investment resources in favour of labour-intensive sectors. They can furthermore provide 
an entry point into programme development for labour-based investment programmes. 
Such studies are based on an analysis of the infrastructure component of different budget 
lines within a government’s public investment plan or budget. Since such data is not readily 
available, most studies are rapidly carried out based on assumptions that need to be verified.  
A public investment plan or budget is not organized by classification of economic sectors, but 
rather on the basis of responsible governmental implementing agency. Therefore, in analysing 
a public investment plan, agriculture is not an economic sector, but rather a government 
department or ministry. Furthermore, in the past, such studies have been based on 
questionable assumptions carried out by consultants who apparently have not been able to  
or had the time to reliably determine the share of a ministry of agriculture’s investment budget 
that is devoted to infrastructure. Furthermore, because not all infrastructure projects present 
technological alternatives (e.g., it would not be realistic to propose that a fruit canning factory 
be built with labour-based technologies, whereas community irrigation and agricultural feeder 
roads do indeed present technological alternatives), it is important to also have information on 
the type of infrastructure involved in order to make a technically realistic assessment of the 
alternative technologies available. 
In undertaking the data availability assessment, one should determine to what extent, first 
of all, public investment budgets and plans are available in the public domain, and second, to 
what extent these budgets are broken down to the level of detail required to determine the 
share and category of infrastructure within any given budget line. Since eventually these 
methodologies will be used by government departments and ministries of finance and 
planning that are responsible for preparing and implementing such budgets, the question  Working Paper  49 
 
of data availability will cease to be an issue. However, it is important that methodologies for 
assessing and monitoring employment impact be based on actual real-life examples of 
investment budgets. 
A third category of study, made in Madagascar and more recently in Cameroon, builds on 
the methodologies and results of the previous two categories, to evaluate and estimate the 
actual and potential impact of the wide-scale and generalised application of labour-based 
infrastructure development programmes on a variety of macro-economic variables such as 
employment creation, GNP, household income and consumption, private investment, public 




African Development Bank Group [AfDB) (2009a) ‘Impact of the Crisis on African Economies – 




African Development Bank Group [AfDB) (2009b) ‘Africa and the Global Economic Crisis: 
Strategies for Preserving the Foundations of Long-term Growth’,  Paper prepared for the 2009 








American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) http://www.recovery.gov/  
Antonopoulos, Rania (2008a) ‘Macro-micro Impacts of Employment Guarantee Programmes’ 
 www.undp-povertycentre.org/paper-seminar/IPCSeminar_Rania_Antonopoulos.pdf  
Antonopoulos, Rania (2008b) ‘Impact of Employment Guarantee Programmes on Gender 
Equality and Pro-Poor Economic Development’ Policy Brief: Case Study on South Africa 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/.../South_Africa/Policy_Brief_EPWP_South_Africa.pdf 
Antonopoulos, Rania (2007) ‘Employment Guarantee Policies from a Gender Equality 
Perspective’ www.12thiloseminar.com/papers/ANTONOPOULOS.doc  
Antonopoulos, Rania and Fontana, Marzia (2006), ‘Hidden Vacancies?: From Unpaid Work to a 
Gender Aware Public Job Creation: Toward a path of gender equality and pro-poor 
development,’ Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, 2006. 
Adhikari, Anindita  and Kartika Bhatia (2010)  “NREGA Wage Payments: Can We 
Bank on the Banks?” Economic & Political Weekly, January 2, 2010 Vol. XIV, No 1  
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/NREGA%20Wage%20Payments.pdf  
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay Country Management Unit Human 
Development Department, Latin America and the Caribbean Region (2009) 
Argentina:  Income Support Policies toward the Bicentennial 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPLABSOCPRO/Resources/Argenti
na_WP_Income_Support_red_cover.pdf   
Asian Development Bank (2008) Social Protection Index for Committed Poverty 
Reduction Volume 2: Asia Part II: The Definition of Social Protection 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Social-Protection/Volume2/Part2.pdf  
Asian Development Bank (2006) ‘The Challenge of Job Creation in Asia,’ 
http://ss.adb.org/?cx=003580287232275984586%3A28nh6wpajf4&q=the+challeng
e+of+job+creation&sa=Search  
Baba Amte Centre for People’s Empowerment Samaj Pragati Sahayog (July 2006) 
‘National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Watershed Works Manual’  
http://www.arghyam.org/node/15 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo and Rachel Glennerster and Cynthia Kinnan (2009) ‘ 
The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomised Evaluation’   
http://www.povertyactionlab.com/papers/101_Duflo_Microfinance_Miracle.pdf 
Barrientos, A. and Hinojosa-Valencia, L. (2009) 'A Review of Social Protection in Latin America' 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectid=4AA14C5A-EC76-A7E5-49068DFE1CC056E3  
Barrell, Ray and Dawn Holland, and Dirk Willem te Velde (2009) ‘A fiscal stimulus to address the 
effects of the global financial crisis on sub-Saharan Africa‘ 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3225.pdf  
Bateman, Milford and Ha-Joon Chang (2009) ‘The Microfinance Illusion’ 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/chang/pubs/Microfinance.pdf  
Betcherman, Gordon and Amit Dar (2004) ‘Impacts of Active Labor Market Programs:  
New Evidence from Evaluations with Particular Attention to Developing and Transition 
Countries’ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Labor-Market-DP/0402.pdf  
Betcherman, Gordon, Amit Dar, Amy Luinstra, and Makoto Ogawa (2001) ‘East Asian Labor 
Markets and the Economic Crisis: Impacts, Responses and Lessons’, Betcherman, G. & Islam, R.  




Bhaduri, A. (2005) ‘Macroeconomic Policies for Higher Employment in the Era of Globalization,’ 
ILO Employment Strategy Papers 2005/11, Geneva: International Labour Office, 
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/esp2005-11.pdf    
Bonilla García and J.V. Gruat (2003) ‘A Life Cycle Continuum Investment for Social Justice, 
Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development’ Social Protection Sector, ILO, Geneva 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/download/lifecycl/lifecycle.pdf 
Bhorat, Haroon and Carlene van der Westhuizen and Toughedah Jacobs (2009) ‘Income and 
Non-Income Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa: What are the Drivers and Possible Policy 
Interventions?’ http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/WorkingPapers/PDF_Files/WP_09-138_3.pdf 
Buvinic, Myra (2009) ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Assessing Vulnerability for Women and 
Children, Identifying Policy Responses’. Written Statement submitted to the Interactive Expert 
Panel on the Emerging Issue: The gender perspectives of the Financial Crisis, Commission on 
the Status of Women Fifty-third session New York, 2 – 13 March 2009 
www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw53/panels/financial_crisis/Buvinic.formatted.pdf 
Cain, Emma (2009) ‘Social Protection and Vulnerability, Risk and Exclusion across the Life-Cycle’ 
HelpAge International http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/39/43280790.pdf   
Campbell, Ian (2008) ‘Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Public Works Program:   




Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) (2008) ‘NREGA Opportunities and Challenges, 
Natural Resource Management and Livelihood Unit’, CSE, New Delhi, India 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/nrega_opportunities_and_challenges08.pdf 
Chakraborty, Pinaki, (2007) ‘Implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
in India: Spatial Dimensions and Fiscal Implications,’ The Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College, Working Paper No. 505 http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_505.pdf  
Cook, B.   (2008) ‘Active Labour Market Policies in the Neo-Liberal Era’,. Working Paper  
No. 08-03, Centre of Full Employment and Equity, 
http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/pubs/wp/2008/08-03.pdf   
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, (2008) ‘Towards a Global Social Contract: 
Labour Rights for Legal Empowerment of the Poor,’ Vol. II, Making the Law Work for Everyone, 
Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, CLEP/UNDP, New York, 2008. 
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/docs/ReportVolumeII/ch3.pdf  
‘Countering the Meltdown: Urban Employment Guarantee’ (2009) Transparency Review, 
Journal of Transparency Studies, January – February, 2009 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/transparency_review_vol2_jan_feb09.pdf 
Das, Sandip (2009) ‘Bank account must, no cash payment for NREGA wage’, Financial Express, 
1-30-2009 http://www.financialexpress.com/news/bank-account-must-no-cash-payment-for-
nrega-wage/416726/  
Davies, M and McGregor, J.A. (2009) 'Social Protection Responses to the Financial Crisis:  
What do we know?' IDS In Focus Policy Briefing 7.4 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/download.cfm?objectid=3E8CC9CC-5056-8171-7B3BCA3FF00E8F81  
del Ninno, Carlo and Kalanidhi Subbarao and Annamaria Milazzo (2009) ‘How to Make Public 
Works Work:  A Review of the Experiences’ World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper 
48567 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Safety-Nets-DP/0905.pdf 
Devereux, Stephen and Bruce Guenther (2009) ‘Agriculture and Social Protection in Ethiopia’ 
FAC Working Paper No. SP03 http://www.future-
agricultures.org/pdf%20files/Social_Protection/Working%20Paper%20No%20SP03%20-
%20Agriculture%20&%20Social%20Protection%20in%20Ethiopia.pdf    
Devereux, S., and C. Solomon (2006) ‘Employment Creation Programmes: The International 
Experience.’ Issues in Employment and Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 24. Geneva: Economic 
and Labour Market Analysis Department, International Labour Office 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_242_engl.pdf  
Devereux, Stephen and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler (October 2004) ‘Transformative Social 
Protection’, IDS Working Paper 232; http://www.ids.ac.uk/download.cfm?file=wp232.pdf   
Devereux, Stephen (2002) ‘From Workfare to Fair Work: The contribution of public works  
and other labour-based infrastructure programmes to poverty alleviation’ Recovery and 
Reconstruction Department International Labour Office, Geneva 
http://staging2.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/lang--en/docName--
WCMS_120741/index.htm 
DFID (2006) ‘Social Protection Briefing Note Series, Number 1: Social protection in poor 
countries http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SP17.pdf    
Economists for Full Employment network http://www.economistsforfullemployment.org/  
ESCAP (2002/03) ‘A Note on Unemployment in the Wake of the Asian Economic Crisis and 
Some Responses’ Prepared under the supervision of the Development Policy Analysis Section, 
Development Research and Policy Analysis Division and included in the Bulletin on Asia-Pacific 
Perspectives 2002/03 www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/bulletin%202002/ch3.pdf  
Forstater, Mathew (1999) ‘Functional Finance and Full Employment: Lessons from Lerner for 
Today?’ Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper #272 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp272.pdf  
FAO (2008) ‘Food Security Information for Action: Targeting’  (Lesson 4 Learners’ Notes) 
www.foodsec.org/DL/course/shortcourseFT/.../learnernotes0410.doc   
Galasso, Emanuela and Martin Ravallion (2003) ‘Social Protection in a Crisis: Argentina’s  
Plan Jefes y Jefas’ http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/12/08/000012009_2003120811
2939/Rendered/PDF/wps3165.pdf  
Gaude, Jacques; Guichaoua, A.; Martens, B; and Miller, S. (1987) ‘Rural development and 
labour-intensive schemes: Impact studies of some pilot programmes,’ International Labour 
Review, Vol. 126, no. 4, July-August 1987. 
Gaude, Jacques and Miller, Steven (1990), ‘Rural development and local resource intensity:   
a case study approach,’ in Human Development and the International Development Strategy  
for the 1990s, edited by Keith Griffin and John Knight, Macmillan, 1990. 
Gaude, Jacques and Miller, Steven (1992), eds. (2002) ‘Productive Employment for the Poor’, 
International Labour Review, Vol. 131, 1992, No. 1. 
Gentleman, Amelia (2006), ‘India’s war on poverty: Easy victory unlikely,’ International Herald 
Tribune, 28 February 2006. http://www.socialwatchindia.net/news_page1.asp?newsid=19  
Daniel O. Gilligan, John Hoddinott, and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse (2008) ‘The Impact of 
Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and its Linkages’ 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp00839.pdf  
Government of Ethiopia [Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Food Security 
Coordination Directorate] (2010) ‘Overview of the Productive Safety Net Program’ 
www.undg.org/docs/10985/PSNP-Presentation_January-2010.ppt   
Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development (2008) ‘Report of the Task Force on 
Convergence’ http://www.empowerpoor.org/downloads/Report_TF_Convergence.pdf 
Government of India [Ministry of Agriculture National Commission on Farmers] (2006) ‘Serving 
Farmers and Saving Farming: Fifth and Final Report Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth 
of Farmers’ Welfare’ http://krishakayog.gov.in/5threp1.pdf  
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] (2008) ‘The National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act 2005 (NREGA) Operational Guidelines’ (2008), 3rd Edition 
http://nrega.nic.in/Nrega_guidelinesEng.pdf    
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act [NREGA] (2006-07) Some Reports from the Field’. http://nrega.nic.in/best_pre_doc.pdf   
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] (2009) ‘National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act: Opportunity for Sustainable Rural Development through Inter-sectoral 
Convergence’ 
http://www.nrega.net/csd/events/presentation/NREGA_Workshop_Rita_Sharma.pdf  
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] Circular No. M-12014/8/2006-NREGA 
(Part) by Amita Sharma http://nrega.nic.in/circular/Bank_Post_18032010.pdf  
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] “Social Audit Format for NREGS”, D.O.  
No. PS/JS(S)/NREGA- Social Audit-2007 by Amita Sharma 
http://nrega.nic.in/circular/DO_SRDS_Social%20Audit_23.8.2007.pdf  
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] NREGA Presentations: “Strengthening RTI 
Proactive Disclosure under RTI- Problems and Perspectives” 
http://nrega.nic.in/ProactiveDisc.ppt    
Government of India [Ministry of Rural Development] “Convergence Guidelines: SGSY and 
ICAR” http://nrega.nic.in/ICAR/Convergence_Sgsy.pdf  
Government of India [Directive Principles of State Policy] 
http://sec.up.nic.in/acts_rules/coi_english/Part_4.pdf    
Government of Maharashtra [India]  (2006), ‘The Maharashtra State Employment Guarantee 
Scheme 2006’, http://nagarzp.gov.in/html_docs/MREGS.htm  
‘Government of Rajasthan [India] Online BPL Census’, PC Quest, Tuesday, June 03, 2008. [India] 
http://pcquest.ciol.com/content/contentimplementation2008/2008/108060303.asp 
Government of the Republic of South Africa Department of Public Works EPWP (2009a) 
‘Infrastructure Sector: Incentive Grant Manual’ 
http://www.epwp.gov.za/Downloads/Incentive_manual.pdf 
Government of the Republic of South Africa Department of Public Works (2009b) ‘EPWP Phase 
II’ [powerpoint] www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090623epwp.ppt  
Government of the Republic of South Africa Department of Public Works Expanded Public 
Works Programme (EPWP) ‘Overview of EPWP Phase 2, Second Economy Strategy’ (version 
September 2008a) http://www.tips.org.za/files/presentations/EPWP_Phase_2_Overview.pdf   
Government of the Republic of South Africa (2008b) ‘Medium Term Budget Policy Statement’ 
Chapter 6: Social Security 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/review/chap6.pdf  
Government of the Republic of South Africa, Department of Social Development (2006) 
‘Linking Social Grants Beneficiaries to Poverty Alleviation and Economic Activity’ Discussion 
Document. 
http://www.amfisa.org.za/Downloads/linking%20social%20grants%20to%20economic%20dev
elopment%20social%20development%202007.pdf    
Government of the Republic of South Africa (2002) ‘Code of Good Practice for employment and 
conditions of work in Special Public Works Programmes’, Government Gazette, 25 January 
2002, Department of Labour. www.epwp.gov.za/Downloads/legal_codeofgood.doc 
Harvey, Philip (2003). ‘The Right to Work and Basic Income Guarantees: A Comparative 
Assessment.’ http://www.usbig.net/papers/057-Harvey-Right2Work.doc 
Hirway, Indira (2007) ‘Reaching Inclusive Growth through Employment Guarantee 
Programmes’ National Conference on 'Making Growth Inclusive With Reference to 
Employment Generation', 28-29th June, 2007, Jawaharlal Nehru University,  
New Delhi, India http://www.macroscan.org/spfea/jun07/spfea020707_JUN_IIAS.htm  
Hirway, Indira (undated) ‘India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Challenges  
Ahead’ CFDA Working Paper #9 
http://cfda.ac.in/download/Indias%20National%20Rural%20Employment%20Guarantee%20A
ct%20Challenges%20Ahead.pdf   
Hirway, Indira (2006) ‘Enhancing Livelihood Security through the National Employment 
Guarantee Act: Toward Effective Implementation of the Act’ The Levy Economics Institute  
of Bard College Working Paper 437 http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_437.pdf      
Hirway, Indira (undated) ‘Assessing Impact of NREGA Works in a Village Based on Village SAM’ 
http://www.economistsforfullemployment.org/news/documents/Hirway_nana_kotda_SAM.pdf  
I4donline (2006) ‘ICT in NREGA implementation’ http://www.i4donline.net/aug06/778.pdf  
IDB (2009) Social and Labor Market Policies for Tumultuous Times 
www.iadb.org.uy/res/includes/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=B-636&pub_file_name=pubB-636.pdf  
ILO and WHO (2009) “The Social Protection Floor: A joint Crisis Initiative of the UN Chief  
Executives Board for Co-ordination  on the Social Protection Floor”  
http://www.un.org/ga/second/64/socialprotection.pdf  
ILO (2009a) Global Employment Trends Report 2009, Geneva 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_101461.pdf  
ILO (2009b) ‘The financial and economic crisis:  A Decent Work Response, High-level Tripartite 
Meeting on the Current Global Financial and Economic Crisis,’ Geneva, 23 March 2009 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_103580.pdf   
ILO (2008) World of Work Report 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/world08.pdf  
ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 6th Edition, chapter 1, Section A ‘Decent 
Employment and the Millennium Development Goals: Description and analysis of a new target’ 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/index.htm  
ILO (2007) ‘The Decent Work Agenda in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs):  
Recent Developments,’ Governing Body, GB.300/ESP/3, November 2007, Geneva. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_084250.pdf  
ILO (2005) ILO Thesaurus 2005 http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO-
Thesaurus/english/tr899.htm  
ILO (2002) Committee on the Informal Economy, International Labour Conference, 90th Session 
ILO (1998) ‘Job Creation Programmes in the ILO (a) Employment Generation for Poverty 
Reduction: The role of employment-intensive approaches in infrastructure investment 
programmes,’ Governing Body, GB.273/ESP/4/1, November 1998   
ILO Employment Sector (forthcoming) "Employment Report No. 6: 'Mitigating a Jobs  
Crisis:  Innovations in Public Employment Programmes (IPEP)'" by Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song  
and Kate Philip   
ILO Toolkit for Mainstreaming Employment and Decent Work 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pardev/download/toolkit_en.pdf  
ILO ‘Decent Work FAQ: Making Decent Work a Global Goal’ 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Feature_stories/lan
g--en/WCMS_071241/index.htm  
ILO (website) ‘National Stimulus and Recovery Packages’ 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/support/lib/financialcrisis/recovery/index.htm  
ILO (Integrated Rural Access Planning - IRAP) 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/about/localplan.htm 
International Institute for Labour Studies [Sameer Khatiwada] (2009) ‘Stimulus Packages to 
Counter Global Economic Crisis: A review’ 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dp19609.pdf    
IMF (2009) ‘The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus’ prepared by the Research Department (Charles 
Freedman, Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton, and Jaewoo Lee) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0903.pdf  
Institute for Policy Studies (2009) ‘Skewed Priorities: How the Bailouts Dwarf Other Global Crisis 
Spending’ http://www.ips-dc.org/getfile.php?id=314 
Jenkins, Rob and Anne Marie Goetz (1999) “Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical 
Implications of the Right-to-Information Movement in India” Third World Quarterly, vol. 20,  
No. 3 (1999), pp. 603-22. http://www.mkssindia.org/node/31    
Jenson, Jane (2008) ‘Redesigning citizenship regimes after neo-liberalism: Convergence 
around the idea of social investment’ http://cinefogo.cuni.cz/getfile.php?&id_file=512  
Jenson, Jane (2009) ‘Lost in Translation: The Social Investment Perspective and Gender 
Equality’ http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/16/4/446  
Johnson, Doug ‘Financial Inclusion & Delivery of Social Transfer Payments’ 
http://cga.nic.in/pdf/DougJohnson.pdf  
Kabeer, Naila and Sarah Cook (2009) ‘Socio-economic security over the life course: A global 
review of social protection’ http://www.ids.ac.uk/download.cfm?objectid=E2A31EB9-939E-
FDC0-EB77737DF469E9E9  
Kaboub, Fadhel (2007a) ‘An ELR-led Economic Development: A Plan for Tunisia’ Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 499. 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_499.pdf  
Kaboub, Fadhel (2007b) ‘Employment Guarantee Programs: A Survey of Theories and Policy 
Experiences,’ Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 498. 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_498.pdf  
Kar, Anirban (2009) ‘Don't bank on them’ Business Standard  
http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=347612&tp=  
Karimi, Zahra (2008) ‘Financing Job Guarantee Schemes by Oil Revenue The Case of Iran’  
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 527. 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_527.pdf  
Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2009) ‘Expanding Microenterprise Credit Access: Using 
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts in Manila’ 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jzinman/Papers/expandingaccess_manila_jul09.pdf    
Karnani, Aneel (2007) Microfinance misses its mark, Stanford Social Innovation Review 
(Summer). http://www.ssireview.org/images/articles/2007SU_feature_karnani.pdf  
Kelkar, Govind (2009) ‘Gender and productive assets:  implications of national rural 
employment guarantee for women’s agency and productivity’ http://www.fao-
ilo.org/more/workshop/papers/en/ 
Khan A R (2007), ‘Employment and Millennium Development Goals: Analytics of the Linkage in 
the Context of an Accelerated Effort to Achieve the MDGs’, Bangladesh Development Studies, 
Vol. XXXI, Nos. 1 & 2, available on http://www.azizkhan.net/EmploymentMDG.pdf 
Khera, Reetika and Nandini Nayak (2009) ‘What works against Women’ Frontline, Volume 26 - 
Issue 01: Jan. 03-16, 2009 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2601/stories/20090116260101200.htm  
King-Dejardin, Amelita and Jessica Owens (2009)  ‘Asia in the Global Economic Crisis: Impacts 
and Responses from a Gender Perspective’ Technical Note prepared for the High-Level 
Regional Forum on Responding to the Economic Crisis – Coherent Policies for Growth,  
Employment and Decent Work in Asia and Pacific, Manila, Philippines, 18-20 February 2009 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_101737.pdf   
Kostzer, Daniel (2008) ‘Argentina: A Case Study on the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, 
or the Employment Road to Economic Recovery’ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132772 
Kostzer, Daniel (2008b) ‘Employment Guarantee Programmes’, UNDP Poverty Reduction 
Insights Interview December 19, 2008 [UNDP access] 
Kostzer, Daniel (2004) ‘Globalization and Disarticulation:  The Road to Exclusion in Latin 
America’ CFEPS Working Paper No. 36, August 2004 http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp-pdf/WP36-
Kostzer.pdf  
Kregel, Jan (2004) ‘ELR as an Alternative Development Strategy’  
http://www.cfeps.org/ss2008/ss08r/kregel/KregelELRConf.pdf  
 Krugman, Paul (2009) ‘Free to Lose’ New York Times Op Ed. November 13, 2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/opinion/13krugman.html?em 
Leibbrandt, Murray and Ingrid Woolard, Arden Finn and Jonathan Argent (2010)   
‘Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the fall of Apartheid’ OECD 
SOCIAL, Employment And Migration Working Papers No. 101  
http://ideas.repec.org/p/oec/elsaab/101-en.html 
Levy Economics Institute Press Release (2009) ‘Government Job Programs that Focus on Social 
Services more than Infrastructure may offer Greater Benefits to Economy’ June 8, 2009 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1155 
Levy Economics Institute Conference on ‘Employment Guarantee Policies: Theory and Practice’ 
(Oct 13-14, 2006) http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=825 
Lieuw-Kie-Song, Maikel, and Miller, Steven (2010) ‘Scaling-up the MDGs: the case for an 
employment-centred focus,’ UNDP (forthcoming) 
Lieuw-Kie-Song, Maikel (2009) ‘Green Jobs for the Poor:  A Public Employment Approach’ 
UNDP/Poverty Group discussion Paper PG/2009/002  
http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/download/asset/?asset_id=2066611     
Lin, Justin (2009) ‘Weathering the Global Economic Crisis: Lessons for Emerging Markets’ 
Presentation at the University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa, July 15, 2009 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-1104785060319/598886-
1104852366603/599473-1223731755312/weathering-the-global-economic-crisis.pdf   
Lindert, Kathy, Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière (2007) ‘The Nuts and Bolts 
of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized 
Context’ WB/SP Paper 0709 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPLABSOCPRO/Resources/BRBolsaFamiliaDisc
ussionPaper.pdf  
Lustig, Nora (2009) ‘A Pro-poor Response to the Current Economic Crisis: Safety Nets and 
Beyond’ in UNDP Guidance Note: Designing and implementing social protection and social 
safety nets to respond to the crisis (Draft May 21, 2009) developed by the Poverty, Human 
Development and MDG Cluster at the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean-
UNDP for BDP [internal circulation only]  
Lustig, Nora and Michael Waldon (1999) ‘Crises and the Poor: A Template for Action’,  
Inter-American Development Bank Conference on Social Protection and Poverty 
www.iadb.org.uy/sds/doc/855eng.rtf  
Marcus, Rachel (2007) ‘Social protection transfers for chronically poor people’ Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre Policy Brief #2.  
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/PB_2.pdf   
Márquez, Gustavo (2000) ‘Labor Markets and Income Support: What Did We Learn  
From the Crises?’ Inter-American Development Bank, RES Working Paper # 4219 
http://www.iadb.org/res/includes/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-425&pub_file_name=pubWP-425.pdf  
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan Collective (2006) ‘Transparency, Accountability – Using the 
People’s Right to Information for Proper Implementation of the NREGA’ 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/mkss06nrega-rti.doc  
McCord, Anna (2009) ‘Overview of Public Works Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa Report’ 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4700.pdf  
McCord, Anna and John Farrington (2008) ‘Digging holes and filling them in again? How far do 
public works enhance livelihoods?’  Natural Resource Perspectives # 120, November 2008 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2571.pdf   
McCord, Anna (2008) ‘A typology for Public Works Programming’ Natural Resource 
Perspectives #121, December 2008 http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2608.pdf  
McCord, Anna (2007) ‘EPWP Mid Term Review: Component 1 International PWP Comparative 
Study’ SALDRU, University of Cape Town 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/research/output/outputDocuments/5468_McCord_MidtermreviewofEP
WPcomparativestudy.pdf  
McCord, Anna (2005) ‘Win-win or lose-lose?  An Examination of the Use of Public Works as a 
Social Protection Instrument in Situations of Chronic Poverty’ presented at the Conference on 
Social Protection for Chronic Poverty, Institute for Development Policy and Management 
University of Manchester, 23-24 Feb 2005 
http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/events/conferences/documents/Social%20Protecti
on%20Papers/McCord.pdf  
McCord, Anna (2004) ‘Policy Expectations and Programme Reality: The Poverty Reduction and 
Labour Market Impact of Two Public Works Programmes in South Africa’ ODI/ESAU Working 
paper 8 http://www.odi.org.uk/spiru/publications/working_papers/Esau_8_South_Africa.pdf  
Mehrotra, Santosh (2008a) ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005,’ presentation at 
the Citizen City  International Symposium on ELR, Rio de Janeiro, May 2008. 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/EFFE/Santosh.pdf  
Mehrotra, Santosh (2008b) ‘NREG Two Years On: Where do we go from here?’ 
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/2_38.pdf  
Menon, Sudha Venu (2008) ‘Right to Information Act and NREGA:  Reflections on Rajasthan’   
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7351/1/MPRA_paper_7351.pdf   
Miller, Steven (1992), ‘Remuneration systems for Labour Intensive investments:  
Lessons for Equity and Growth,’ International Labour Review, Vol. 131, 1992, No. 1  
Mitchell W (2008) ‘Assessing the wage transfer function and developing a minimum wage 
framework for the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa’, Centre for Full 
Employment and Equity, University of Newcastle, Newcastle Australia 
http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/pubs/reports/2008/ILO_South_Africa/EPWP_Assessment_Bi
ll_Mitchell_June_2008_complete.pdf  
Mujeri, M.K. (2002) ‘Bangladesh: Bringing Poverty Focus in Rural Infrastructure 
Development’, Discussion Paper 6, Geneva: Recovery and Reconstruction Department 
International Labour Office. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/dwresources/dwbrowse.page?p_lang=en&p_tool_id=115 
Nayak, Nandini and Khera Reetika (2009) ‘Women workers and perceptions of the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India’ http://www.fao-
ilo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fao_ilo/pdf/Papers/24_March/Nayak_-_formatted.pdf  
Nobatana, Themba (2007) “Repositioning Expanded Public Works” 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo28/art6.html  
Oakley, P. (1999) Organisation, contracting and negotiation in development programmes and 
projects:  A study of current practice at the community level. ILO, Geneva. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/download/org_contr_negot.pdf 
Ocampo, Jose-Antonio and Stephany Griffith Jones (2009) ‘The Financial Crisis and Its Impact 
on Developing Countries’, IPC Working Paper # 53. April 2009 http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper53.pdf  
OECD (2009) ‘Social Protection, Poverty Reduction and Pro-Poor Growth’, Policy Guidance 
Note: Social Protection http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/63/43573310.pdf  
Papadimitriou, Dimitri B. (2008) ‘Promoting Equality through an Employment of Last Resort’, 
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper 545 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_545.pdf   
Philip, Kate (2009) ‘The Community Work Programme in South Africa’ 
http://www.levy.org/pubs/conf_june09/conf_june09_files/presentations/Session5b_Philip.pdf  
Pollin, Robert, Epstein, Gerald, Heintz, James and Ndikumana, Léonce (2006) An Employment-
targeted Economic Programme for South Africa, Country Study 1, Brasilia: International Policy 
Centre for Inclusive Growth Centre (UNDP), www.undp-
povertycentre.org/publications/reports/South%20Africa.pdf   
Pollin, Robert, Githinji, Mwangi and Heintz, James (2007) An Employment-Targeted Economic 
Program for Kenya, Brasilia: International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (UNDP)  
www.undp-povertycentre.org/publications/reports/Kenya.pdf    
RAGAS - An ICT tool to implement NREGS benefitting the bottom most layer  
of pyramid in Andhra Pradesh   
http://event.stockholmchallenge.se/project/2008/Public-Administration/RAGAS-ict-tool-
implement-NREGS-benefitting-bottom-most-layer-pyramid-Andhra-Pradesh 
   
Raju, K. and M. Padma (2009) Department of Rural Development chapter in Transforming 




Ram, V.B. N. (2008) ‘Learning from Andhra’ 
http://www.livemint.com/2008/09/22234019/Learning-from-Andhra.html?d=1  
Ravallion, Martin (2008) ‘Bailing Out the World's Poorest’ World Bank Development Research 
Group (DECRG) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4763 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/12/16/000158349_200
81216092058/Rendered/PDF/WPS4763.pdf  




Rodríguez Enríquez, Corina (2007) ‘Labour, Employment and Social Policy: the case of 
Argentina’ http://www.econ.utah.edu/genmac/DOC/2007/2007papers/corinaengpap.pdf  
Roodman, David  and Jonathan Morduch (2009)  ‘The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in 
Bangladesh: Revisiting the Evidence’’ CGD Working Paper 174 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/1422302_file_Roodman_Morduch_Bangladesh.pdf  
Roy, Rathin, Heuty, Antoine and Letouzé, Emmanuel (2006) ‘Fiscal Space for Public Investment: 
Towards a Human Development Approach’, Paper prepared for the G-24 technical meeting, 
Singapore, 13–14 September, http://www.g24.org/rroy0906.pdf 
Sadan, Mastoera (2005) ‘A Gendered analysis of the working for water programme: a case 
study of the Tsitsikama Working for Water project’, Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1303  
Sainath,P.  (2008) ‘NREGA hits buses to Mumbai’ http://indiatogether.com/2008/jul/psa-
mumbai.htm  
_______. (2007) ‘NREGA: No place for single women’ http://indiatogether.com/2007/may/psa-
nregs.htm  
Salazar-Xirinachs, Jose M.(2008)  ‘Social Security and Employment: Perspectives on the Linkages’, 
Presentation at the Asia-Pacific Regional High Level Meeting on Socially Inclusive Strategies to 
Extend Social Security Coverage, New Delhi, India, 19 New Delhi, India, 19-20 May 2008  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/events/sis/download/paper54.pdf  
Samson, Melanie (2006) ‘Waste Management Public Works Programmes – Creating the 
Conditions of the ‘Second Economy’,’ unpublished manuscript. 
Samson, Melanie et. al (2005) ‘Organising Waste Management Workers: The South African 
Experience,’ International Labour Office, Pretoria. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/empent/docs/F947902920/Waste-webversion.pdf   
Secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) (2007) 
Toolkit for Mainstreaming Employment and Decent Work 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/pardev/relations/multilateral/toolkit.htm  
- ‘CEB Communiqué  (2009) http://www.unesco.org/education/CEB_FinalCommunique.pdf  
Shah, Mihir (2008) ‘Governance reform key to NREGA success’, Hindu, Opinion 2008/03/14/ 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/03/14/stories/2008031455581000.htm         
Shah, Mihir and Pramathesh Ambasta (2008) ‘NREGA: Andhra Pradesh shows the way’, Hindu 
Newspaper, Sept 8. http://www.hinduonnet.com/2008/09/08/stories/2008090856271000.htm  
Shah, Mihir and Pramathesh Ambasta, P S Vijay Shankar (2008) ‘Two Years of NREGA: the Road 
Ahead’ EPW February 23, 2008  
http://www.nregaconsortium.in/downloads/NREGA_EPW_Feb%2023_2008.pdf 
Sharma, A. (2010) ‘Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005: A Rights-
based Law for Inclusive Growth’. Mimeograph  http://www.ipc-undp.org/pressroom/files/ipc130.pdf 
Sharp, Kay and Taylor Brown and Amdissa Teshome (2006) ‘Targeting Ethiopia’s Productive 
Safety Net Programme (PSNP)’ http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3035.pdf   
Sjoblom, Disa and John Farrington (2008) ‘The Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act: Will it reduce poverty and boost the economy?’ ODI Project Briefing # 7 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/odi-publications/project-briefings/7-indian-national-rural-
employment-guarantee-act.pdf  
Solution Exchange for the Work and Employment Community (2007a) ‘Consolidated Reply: 
NREGA Works for Natural Resource Management –Experiences’ 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/SD/SDA/SDAR/sard/Consolidated%20reply%20NREGA%20and%20NRM.pdf  
Solution Exchange for the Work and Employment Community (2007b) ‘Consolidated Reply: 
Use of ICT for NREGP Implementation – Some Examples http://www.solutionexchange-
un.net.in/emp/cr-public/cr-se-emp-ictd-12050701-public.pdf  
Stiglitz, Joseph (2009) Presentation at the UN General Assembly Interactive thematic dialogue 
on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development, 27 March 2009 
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/ondemand/ga/63/2009/ga090326am.rm  
Subbarao, Kalanidhi (2003) ‘Systemic Shocks and Social Protection: Role and Effectiveness  
of Public Works Programs’ Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No 0302 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Safety-Nets-DP/0302.pdf       
Sumarto, Sudarno, Asep Suryahadi and Lant Pritchett (2005) ‘Safety Nets and Safety Ropes: 
Who Benefited from Two Indonesian Crisis Programs - The ‘Poor’ or the ‘Shocked?’’ 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/10/22/000094946_0010040532
3998/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf   
Swarup, Anil (2008) ‘Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana : Providing health insurance cover to the 
poor’ Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India  Technical Paper presented at  
   
Asia-Pacific Regional High-Level Meeting on Socially-Inclusive Strategies to Extend Social 
Security Coverage, New Delhi, 19-20 May 2008 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/events/sis/download/paper39.pdf  
Tabbush, Constanza (2008) ‘Contesting Gender Narratives in Development Policies: Women 
and Conditional Cash Transfers in Argentina’ http://gencen.msu.edu/documents/WP292.pdf  
Tcherneva, Pavlina R. and Randall Wray (2005a) ‘Employer of Last Resort: A Case Study of 
Argentina's Jefes Program’  
Tcherneva, Pavlina R. and Randall Wray (2005b)  ‘Is Jefes de Hogar an Employer of  
Last Resort Program? An Assessment of Argentina's Ability to Deliver the Promise of Full 
Employment and Price Stability’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009618  
Tcherneva, Pavlina R.  and Randall Wray (2005c) ‘Gender and the Job Guarantee: The impact of 
Argentina’s Jefes programme on female heads of poor households’ CFEPS Working Paper  
No. 50,  http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp-pdf/WP50-Tcherneva-Wray.pdf  
Tcherneva, Pavlina R (2004) ‘Job or Income Guarantee?’ USBIG Discussion Paper No. 79 
www.usbig.net/papers/079-Tcherneva-BIG-v-ELR.doc  
Tewari, Ruhi (2010) “NREGA may be linked to skill development” LiveMint 
http://www.livemint.com/2010/04/14220558/NREGA-may-be-linked-to-skill-d.html  
Tournee, Jane and van Esch, Wilma (2001) Community Contracts in Urban Infrastructure Works, 
Practical Lessons from Experience, International Labour Office, Geneva 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/download/community_contr.pdf  




Tucker, Deborah (2002) ‘Precarious' Non-Standard Employment – A Review of the Literature.’  
Labour Market Policy Group, Department of Labour, Wellington. 
www.dol.govt.nz/PDFs/PrecariousNSWorkLitReview.pdf  
UNDP (2008) ‘Development and Institutional Results Frameworks’ (draft dated 5 May 2008) 
http://www.undp.org/execbrd/word/DRAFT%20RESULTS%20FRAMEWORKS%205%20MAY
%202008.doc 
Unique Identification Authority of India [UIDAI] “UID and NREGA” 
http://uidai.gov.in/documents/UIDandNREGA.pdf  
Unique Identification Authority of India [UIDAI], Planning Commission (April 2010)  
“From Exclusion to Inclusion with Micropayments” 
http://uidai.gov.in/documents/Exclusion_to_Inclusion_with_Micropayments.pdf  
United Nations Statistical Division: Millennium Development Goals Indicators 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm 
United Nations (2009a) ‘Global fiscal stimulus funds could jump-start world economy – UN report’ 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29913&Cr=climate&Cr1=financial+crisis  
United Nations Development Policy and Analysis Division [DPAD] (2009) World Economic 
Situation and Prospects: Monthly Briefing, No. 9 (June) 
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/publications/wespmbn/sgnote_9.pdf  
United News of India (2010) “Business Correspondent model for disbursement of wages under 
NREGA” [March 4, 2010] 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Business+Correspondent+model+for+disbursement+of+wage
s+under+NREGA.-a0224472674 
Van der Hoeven, Rolph and Malte Lubker (2008) ‘Financial Openness and Employment: 
The need for Coherent International and National Policies’ 
http://www.un.org/Docs/ecosoc/meetings/2006/forum/Statements/Van%20Der%20Hoeven_s
tatement.pdf 
Veras Soares, Fabio (2009) ‘Do CCTs Lessen the Impact of the Current Economic Crisis?  
Yes, but...’ IPC One Pager # 96.   http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager96.pdf  
Villatoro, Pablo S [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)] (2008) 
‘CCTs in Latin America: Human Capital Accumulation and Poverty Reduction’ International 
Poverty Centre  Poverty in Focus, Number  15,  August 2008 http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCPovertyInFocus15.pdf  
Vanaik, Anish and Siddhartha (2010) “Bank Payments: End of Corruption in NREGA?”  
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 26, 2008 
Winkler, Harald (20 February 09) ‘Working for energy.’ 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/working-for-energy-2009-02-20 
World Bank  [Margaret Grosh, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi] (2008b)  
For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets ‘Chapter 5 




82761,00.html   
World Bank [Human Development Network] (2008a)  ‘Guidance for Responses from the Human 
Development Sectors to Rising Food Prices’ 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/Resources/HDNFoodandFuel
_Final.pdf  
World Economic Forum (2010) Global Risk Report 2010 
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/globalrisk/Reports/index.htm  
Wray, L. Randall, (2007) ‘The Employer of Last Resort Programme: Could it work for developing 
countries?’ International Labour Office, Economic and Labour Market Papers, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/download/elm/elm07-5.pdf  
Yu, Sandra, ‘Measuring the Informal Economy: Statistical Challenges,’ draft manuscript 
prepared for the ILO Reader on the Informal Economy, Employment Policy Department,  
ILO Geneva. 
“Zeroing in on branchless rural banking” (2007) Special correspondent for the Hindu 




1. See World Bank 2008, Table 7.3; del Ninno, et al. (2009).   
2. See Randall Wray (2005), Kostzer (2004), Bhaduri (2005).  
3. PEPs by themselves may not sufficiently address chronic poverty when the poor cannot work due to illness,  
age, disability or if they are concentrated in geographically inaccessible areas.   
4. E.g., in the wake of the Asian crisis, between 1997 and 1998, GDP contracted an average of 7.7 per cent in  
the five hardest-hit countries. It took two to seven years to recover to pre-crisis levels (ILO 2008, page 69).   
Formal employment rates fell by up to 3.1 per cent and took five to ten years to return to pre-1997 levels. In 
Indonesia—the hardest-hit country—the incidence of poverty took around seven years to return to pre-crisis  
levels (OECD, 2008b). This has to be set against the fact that, before the financial crisis, poverty had fallen 
continuously by around 1 per cent per year!  
5. ILO (2009) cites Duval, Elmeskøv and Vogel (2007) on the importance of implementing proper labour and 
product market policies in helping countries adjust quickly to the aftermath of a shock. 
6.  E.g., according to the ILO’s (2009b) analysis, employment could increase by up to 8 per cent in the long run if the 
entire stimulus package focused on PEPs for infrastructure. Similarly, a study by R. Barrell, D. Holland, and D. Willem 
te Velde (2009) looking into different scenarios for an aid-financed fiscal stimulus in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) finds 
that infrastructure investment provides the greatest impact—an income smoothing effect over the short-term as 
well as a long-run benefit on output.   
7. For assessments of public works programmes adopted after the East Asian financial crisis in Korea and Indonesia, 
see Bechterman and Islam (2001) and Sumarto et al. (2005).    
8. This is true for CCTs that use proxy means tests (in which case, income and current occupational status are not 
part of the calculation, though Chile is an exception here) and seek to address structural (chronic) rather than 
transient poverty. However, if the single registry for social programmes has information on the entirety of the low-
income population (i.e., both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries), then the ‘cut-off’ point could be increased to 
allow more ‘vulnerable’ people to enter the programme as an emergency measure. Given political and budget 
sensitivities, though, this would also require some thinking about how to shrink the programme afterwards. In the 
context of the current crisis, Veras Soares (2009) points out that, in the case of Brazil, it was possible for a variety of 
reasons to increase the number of beneficiaries of Bolsa Família and to raise the value of benefits as an anti-crisis 
measure and that, in Mexico, a new stipend designed to compensate for the rise in food prices was also included in 
the grant components of Progresa/Oportunidades. 
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markets. Also see Forstater (1999) and Tcherneva (2004). 
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15. For new thinking in this area, see South Africa’s Community Work Programme, which is part of the second 
phase of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP 2). For a focus on ‘care’ services, see JJHP and EPWP, Phase I. 
16. See discussion on social protection floor in Section 4 of this paper and also the ILO-led Global Jobs Pact initiative. 
17. See UN Statistical Division, for new a MDG Target 1.B on employment. 
18. The ILO (2009) points out that, in 51 of 73 countries for which data are available, the share of wages in total 
income declined over the past two decades when there was rapid economic growth and strong job creation.  
For India, Hirway (2009) and others point to rising employment, though largely in the informal economy, with signs  
 
of growing rural distress and rising malnutrition; for South Africa, Leibbrandt et al. (2010) point to the labour market as a 
driver of inequality, particularly because a large percentage of households has insufficient access to jobs.   
19. ILO’s Global Trends 2010 indicates that, the overall vulnerable employment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia is likely to have risen to almost four fifths of the employed. The largest negative impact is estimated to have 
occurred in SEE and CIS regions and the Middle East and North Africa.  For post-crisis scenarios, see ILO’s Global 
Trends 2009, particularly Figures 6 and 7, page 21 and Figure 8, page 22.   
20. On the issue of wage-price stability see Tcherneva (2004). Forstater (1999) cited in Tcherneva (2004), further 
argues that the enhanced human capital would reduce the productivity-adjusted cost of hiring from this pool 
relative to unemployed workers and thereby diminish inflationary pressures. 
21. E.g., NREGA is viewed by some as being a first step toward realising the right to work in the Indian context.  
The Directive Principles of State Policy, in particular Directive Principle 39 states: "The State shall in particular direct 
its policy toward securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood” and Directive Principle 41, which says that “the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity  
and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in 
cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.”   
22. See regional background papers: Barrientos and Hinojosa-Valencia (Latin America), Devereux and Cipryk 
(Africa), Cook (East and South East Asia) and Kabeer (South Asia). 
23. CCTs in different countries vary in terms of whether the weight is put on the short-term income smoothing 
effect or on the long-term human capital investment incentives (see Veras-Soares, 2009). 
24. Graduation applies both to graduation from poverty and from a reliance on social transfers, though the cash 
transfers themselves are also supposed to facilitate some investment activity – e.g., Gertler et al. (July 2005, cited in 
Lindert et al., 2007) show that Mexico’s CCT programme was associated with increased investments in micro-
enterprises and agricultural production, with beneficiaries investing about a quarter of all benefits received.    
25. See Banerjee et al. (2009) and Karlan and Zinman (2009), cited in ‘A partial marvel’, The Economist, 16 July 2009. 
Also see Roodman & Morduch (2009), Karnani (2007), and Bateman and Chang (2009). 
26. See Government of South Africa (Department of Social Development) Discussion document (2006), which 
points out that linking caregivers (in the context of child support grants) to employment or training should 
generate a sizable market for services in day-care and early childhood development services, which, in turn, will 
generate work opportunities.   
27. See McCord and Farrington (2008). This is particularly the case for short-term public works programmes rather 
than long-term ones where capacity, planning, and quality of assets can be addressed more systematically to 
reduce ‘leakages’ and spread setup costs.  
28. Villatoro (2008) points out, “The human capital objectives should be integrated with complementary 
programmes and activities that enable families to increase their capacity to generate income. Such a medium-term 
strategy would allow families to graduate from the programmes. But some tension would arise between this 
approach and one based on human capital accumulation, since the latter may result in fewer opportunities to build 
and/or increase the productive capacity of adult beneficiaries.” 
29. In 2004, the Argentina government outlined a strategy to get beneficiaries to voluntarily migrate from the Plan 
Jefes y Jefas to one of two other programmes, Plan Familias and Plan Seguro, with the ‘objective of generating more 
homogeneous groups.’  Surveys leading up to the strategy (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay: Country 
Management Unit Human Development Department, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Argentina (2009) 
pps. 20-12, 45-47) showed that the views of respondents were mixed: on the one hand they preferred work and 
support to children including for fewer benefits in exchange for training, access to employment services (bolsas de 
trabajo), or a concrete job offer. At the same time, the responses also indicated a preference for more benefits, even 
if those benefits were associated with more contraprestaciones, such as school attendance or health check-ups for 
children.  However, as Jane Jenson (2008) points out, the 2004 reform strategy appeared to shift the emphasis from 
workers to children—at least as far as women were concerned: “the language of social investment shaped the 
presentation of the Plan Familias which targeted lone mothers labeled ‘unemployable’”.  Moving the women from 
Jefes y Jefas, with its work requirement, to a cash transfer programme conditional only on proving their children 
were enrolled in school and were regularly vaccinated ensured that they wouldn’t have to juggle care and work 
responsibilities as much; at the same time, though, they would also not have a chance to strengthen their 
capacities or participate in the labour market to find a way out of poverty, since Familias had no work option  
and made no provision for educational or childcare facilities for children under five. See Razavi (2008).  
30. E.g. see Cain (2009), for the definition of a minimum package: child support grants; disability grants; non-
contributory/social pensions; unemployment/working age support; and/or free access to health care services.  
See Leibbrandt et al. (2010), who point out that, while social grants in South Africa have succeeded in reducing the 
poverty gap, especially among the poorest households, households without children have become relatively 
poorer, most often linked to unsuccessful integration into the labour market.  This continues to be a priority. 
31. For how the design of a PEP would vary depending upon which role is prioritized, see ILO (forthcoming) 
32. For a comparative assessment of ALMP policies with regard to different target groups, see B. Cook (2008).  
 
33. As Wray (2007) further points out, “Upgrading of these characteristics would be the second step—with much of 
the necessary training occurring on the job. The unemployed need jobs, not merely the promise of a job for those 
who successfully reform themselves.” Also see World Bank (2008)   in particular Summary Table 7.3. 
34. For e.g., A PEP cannot focus on short-term job opportunities (appropriate for frictional unemployment) if it is to  
respond to structural unemployment.  See  McCord (2004), Nobatana (2007) and ILO (forthcoming).  
35. However, its full development as an EG was cut short. A counterpart work requirement was introduced in early 
2002 to ensure a more targeted focus. Further changes were made more recently when two new programmes 
were launched to gradually replace Jefes, i.e., the Plan Familias, which provides a conditional transfer to households 
with children, and Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo, which provides a non-contributory unemployment benefit 
accompanied by training and job-related services. 
36. One of the issues that are being looked at in the context of EPWP phase II in South Africa, is how the EPWP can 
“enable government to act as an employer of last resort as part of the Anti-Poverty Strategy”. See Government of 
South Africa (2009b and 2008a). Also see Altman et al. (2007) for a discussion of scenarios.  
37. See Kaboub, (2007) and Forstater (1999) for overviews of Abba Lerner’s functional finance theory; also see 
Papadimitriou (2008) and Wray (op. cit., pp. 20-25) on affordability and exchange rate effects of an EG. 
38. See Trinidad and Tobago’s Unemployment Relief Programme (URP). For Iran, see Karimi (2008); for Tunisia, see 
Kaboub (2007a); see Kaboub (2007b) for history of ELR programmes and financing issues. For India’s NREGA, see 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (NREGA) Operational Guidelines (2008) and other sources.   
39. See Roy et al. (2006); for country-specific assessments of policy space, see Pollin et al. (2005). 
40. It can be argued that, since large-scale PEPs or EG are initiated after a crisis, there should be no problem 
implementing a large-scale employment programme for a time unless there is a large current account deficit. 
41. See Lieuw-Kie-Song and Miller, UNDP, (2010, forthcoming). 
42. It should be noted that EPWP Phase II (April 2009-present) introduces the concept of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
jobs, of which it aims to create two million.  Also see Altman et al.  (2007) for a discussion of issues and scenarios 
involved in a discussion of scaling up EPWP. 
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50. See Philip (2009) on South Africa’s community work programme. It aims to “supplement existing livelihood 
strategies, without disrupting or displacing them” and “the injection of regular and predictable income into a 
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72. As indicated earlier, working with competent local and civil society organizations can be useful where public 
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88. NREGA is progressive in requiring women to be paid equal wages. However, the formulation of standard 
operating rates (SORs) does not always allow women to receive the minimum wage. 
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93. See Mehrotra (2008b). He argues that, if NREG includes the proviso that such asset creation begin with the 
small/marginal farmers, but extend to the lands of better-off farmer. The latter could help to weaken farmers’  
 
resistance to the NREG on the ground that it is raising agricultural wage rates and thus raising their costs.   
This point has been debated given the experience of the EGS in Maharashtra, though, where there were  
indications that more well-to-do farmers were able to ‘capture’ labour and assets to benefit their farms.  
94. See National Rural Employment Guarantee Act [NREGA] (2005) and EPWP focus. For a detailed discussion  
of the issues and areas of focus see Lieuw-Kie-Song (2009). 
95. See Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Overview of EPWP Phase 2. 
96. Examples of this are that NGOs that care for orphans would be able to hire additional caretakers or provide 
income to volunteers, church groups could organise to clean streets in their neighbourhood or community-based 
organisations could establish food gardens and hire local people to look after them. Current pilots initiated in 2008 
as part of the Community Works Program already include some of these activities. 
97. The Trinidad and Tobago’s URP Special Projects Delivery component provides community groups, such as 
churches and schools, with assistance for small, medium and large projects that take more than six weeks to 
complete.  Special projects are awarded to contractors within the constituency who will provide the labour and 
materials for the project. Contractors are recruited for projects such as painting, beautification works, and repair of 
damaged community property.  The contractors are paid by the URP and are available only to assist with projects 
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citizens or businesses.  
98. See Salazar-Xirinachs, (2008); Khan (2007); Kregel (2006); Antonopoulos (2007); Papadimitriou (2008). 
99. See EPWP (cited in Devereux and Solomon (2006)): “Training is a critical part of the EPWP. According to the 
Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes as gazetted by the Department of Labour, it is a 
requirement of the EPWP that beneficiaries should undergo at least 2 days of training out of every 22 days worked. 
The Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Projects also require that managers of 
labour-intensive projects be trained in order to build capacity to manage EPWP projects at the required scale.” So 
far, this has included the training for more than 1,500 local government officials and 1,500 previously unemployed 
people (who had secondary education) to become contractors and site supervisors. 
100. Decision-makers are looking to see how linkages can be made between NREGA and a majortraining 
programme - The Swaranjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), which focuses on individuals and Self-Help Groups 
(SHGs) by providing training and capacity building, credit and subsidies for procuring income-generating 
assets/micro-enterprises, making available appropriate technology, and providing infrastructure support and 
backward and forward linkages for facilitating the marketing of the rural products. While, at present, SGSY is 
targeted only at below the poverty line (BPL), there is an attempt to see if families who have worked for more  
than 50 days for two years (indicating the family is in distress and does not have a stable alternative source of 
employment) could benefit from SGSY to be equipped for semi-skilled work. See GOI MORD Convergence 
Guidelines for SGSY and ICAR. 
101. All of the below categories of infrastructure are amenable to labour-based construction technologies. 
102. From Wray, op. cit., p. 13. 
103. In addition, the right to work is recognized in a number of legally binding conventions that countries have 
signed and ratified: Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 8, 
paragraph 3 (a), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Civil Rights (ICCPR); Article 5, paragraph (e) (i), 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 11, paragraph 1 (a), 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Article 32 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; Articles 11, 25, 26, 40, 52 and 54 of the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Further, several regional instruments recognize the 
right to work in its general dimension, including the European Social Charter of 1961 and the Revised European 
Social Charter of 1996 (Part II, art. 1), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 15). Similarly, the right to 
work has been proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in the Declaration on Social Progress and 
Development, in its resolution 2542 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969 (art. 6). 
104. See ILO, ‘The Decent Work Agenda in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): Recent Developments,’ 
Governing Body, GB.300/ESP/3, November 2007, Geneva. 
105. See United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005 cited in of the United Nations 
System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)   (2007), p. v. 
106. See Secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)   (2007) and CEB 
Communiqué (2009).  
107. See UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-11 Development Results Framework, which includes an explicit employment-
related development outcome: ‘MDG-based national development strategies promote growth and employment, 
and reduce economic, gender and social inequalities.’   International
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